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 The issue on whether the epistemological view of Engels and the Marxists can be 
identified to Marx opens the question on what Marx’s actual view on knowledge. This 
debate on Marx’s epistemology is divided between realist and idealist interpretation of 
his texts: the former reads that for Marx knowledge is a copy of an independent reality 
existing outside of man, while the latter views that for the same philosopher, knowledge 
is in some sense constructed by the subject. This study contributes to the discussion by 
closely reading the epistemology of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. 
The Manuscripts contain important epistemological remarks that are subject of scholarly 
debate. The scope of the study aims to read the texts on their own terms, and through that, 
avoid the reductive readings of Marx that plague his interpretations. Through this 
approach, this study argues that Marx in the Manuscripts conveys an idealist 
epistemology based on his concept on how human need shapes human cognition. Marx 
further develops this idealism in the texts in his critique of political economy, where he 
shows that this science is grounded on the estranged need. In the end, this study 
underscores that the Manuscripts’ idealism shows a part in Marx’s thinking that 
underlines the role cognition plays to address forms of estrangements brought by the 
structures of private property. It highlights how Marx empowers man as capable of 
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Discussions on Marx’s epistemology usually start with a distinction between 
Marx and Marxism.1 Marx’s scholars clarify that Marx’s actual view on knowledge 
should be distinguished from Marxism, despite the common impression that they are the 
same.2 Marxism, which is both a theoretical and political movement, popularized a realist 
and positivist interpretation of Marx, which become the prominent reading of Marx’s 
 
1 Tom Rockmore, Marx after Marxism: The Philosophy of Karl Marx (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd., 2002), xii; John Torrance, Karl Marx’s Theory of Ideas (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), xii – xiii; Erick Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man (New York: Frederick 
Ungar Publishing Co., 1961), 1-7; Walter L. Adamson, Introduction to Marx and the 
Disillusionment of Marxism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 1-3; Shlomo 
Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1968), 1; Bhikhu Parekh, “Marxism versus Marx: What Marx’s Theory of Ideology Was Not,” in 
Marx's Theory of Ideology ( London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1982.), 1-28; Czeslaw Prokopczyk, 
Truth and Reality in Marx and Hegel (New York: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), 
1-39; Frederic L. Bender, “Marx, Materialism and the Limits of Philosophy,” Studies in Soviet 
Thought 25, no. 2 (Feb. 1983): 79. 
2 Views that Marxism and Marx are the same: Vladimir Lenin, Materialism and 
Empirico-Criticism (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1972); Mao Tse-Tung, “On Practice, On 
the Relation Between Knowledge and Practice, Between Knowing and Doing (July 1937),” in 
Selected Works of Mao-Tse Tung (New York: Pergamon Press Inc., 1965), 295-310; Georgi 
Plekhanov, “Fundamental Problems of Marxism,” in Selected Philosophical Works, vol. 3 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976); David Myers, “Marx’s Concept of Truth: A Kantian 
Interpretation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, no. 2 ( June 1977): 316-318. Scholars who 
criticize the view that Marx and Marxism are the same: Rockmore, “On Distinguishing Between 
Marx and Marxism,” in Marx after Marxism, 1-4; Prokopczyk, Truth and Reality in Marx and 





philosophy.3 This prevailing view was established by the Marxists who declared that 
Marxism is a philosophy developed and rooted in Marx’s thought. As Lenin puts it, 
“Marxism” is “the system of the views and teachings of Karl Marx.”4  It is a system of 
views and teachings continuous to what Marx has thought. 
The term “Marxism” was introduced by Lenin’s teacher Georgii Plekhanov, who 
is a Russian Marxist philosopher. It denotes a political movement primarily held by the 
Soviet Marxists who thought that what they practically realizing were Marx’s ideas. In its 
theoretical aspect, Marxism holds the view that is referred as dialectical materialism, 
again popularly identified to Marx.5 Stalin defines this view as the “the outlook of the 
“Marx-Leninist party.”6 This outlook is a hybrid of enlightenment’s mechanistic and 
materialist view plus the Hegelian dialectical logic viewed as the deterministic laws of 
nature. It is a scientific theory of historical development of society, governed by the 
deterministic law of contradictions that will culminate in a political revolt against the 
capitalist society and usher in a new socialist state. 
Under dialectical materialism, Marxists’ concept of knowledge is understood in 
the framework of realist epistemology. This epistemology is an offshoot of their 
materialism that views reality as purely matter independently existing from man. The 
 
3 Rockmore provides a good discussion of the development of the ideas of Marxism. 
Rockmore, “Hegel, Marx, and Marxism,” in Marx after Marxism, 1-37. 
4 Ibid., 9.  
5 Gustav Welter, Dialectical Materialism: A historical Systematic Survey of Philosophy 
in the Soviet Union (London: Routledge, 1958). 






independent existence of matter suggests that its cognition can be only grasped in a realist 
sense, which is through creation of a mental copy of the material reality. Lenin 
summarizes this realist view in Materialism and Empirico-criticism where he describes 
that Marx is a realist in so far  that he views reality as “outside of us and [exists] 
independently of us.”7 It means that for Marx cognition consists of a correct reflection of 
an independent material reality, different from what Lenin calls as “Berkeleianism,” 
which is the view that ideas are the basis of knowledge and reality. Lenin underscores 
that Marx sees that reality is matter independently existing of the mind and not a mere 
creation of the mind.  
 The major ideas of Marxism, however, were not derived from Marx but primarily 
from Engels’ and other Marxists’ writings.8 For example, the authorship of dialectical 
materialism is credited to Joseph Dietzgen who have used the term for the first time in a 
work published in 1887.9 Four years after, the term would be used again by Plekhanov in 
his work the Development of the Monist View of History.10  His scholars argue that 
neither Marx in his texts used the term dialectical materialism nor developed its 
 
7 Lenin, Materialism and Empirico-Criticism, ff: 47, 78, and 146. 
8 On the influence of Engels to the interpretation of Marx on the concept of ideology, 
John Torrance, “Marxism versus Marx: What Marx’s Theory of Ideology Was Not,” in Karl 
Marx's theory of ideas (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1-28. On Engels setting a misleading 
context of interpretation of Marx: Czeslaw Prokopczyk, “Philosophical Sources of Marxism in 
Engels’ Retrospection,” in Truth and Reality in Marx and Hegel (New York: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1980), 1-40; Rockmore, “Marx and Engels,” in Marx after Marxism, 8-10;  
Terrell Carver, “Marxism as method,” After Marx (1984): 261-279.  
9 Tony Burns, “Joseph Dietzgen and the History of Marxism,” Science & Society 66, no. 
2 (2002): 202-227. 
10 Georgi Plekhanov, The Development of the Monist view of History (Moscow: Foreign 





deterministic and scientific views.11 The source of determinism and scientific views 
prevalent in the sphere of the Marxists were influenced not by Marx but by the rise of 
positivism in nineteenth century.12 
Aside from that, the deterministic and scientific view of Marxism were mainly 
developed by the Russian Marxists, such as Plekhanov, Lenin, and Stalin, through a 
series of meetings of International Congress of Worker’s Association across Europe, 
commonly called as Internationals.13 These Internationals were discussions of theories, 
practices, defeats, victories, and directions of the workers’ movement. Engels played as 
the main theoretical figure in these meetings after the death of Marx in 1883, shortly after 
the demise of the First International. Russian Marxists, such as Plekhanov and Karl 
Kautsky, became the central theoretical figures in the meetings after Engel’s death in 
1895. Influenced by Engels, they defended the deterministic and scientific form of 
materialism and established dialectical materialism and its implied realist epistemology.  
Engel’s dominance as the spokesperson of Marx’s theories set him as the primary 
source of Marxists’ understanding of Marx.14  The Marxist realist interpretation of Marx 
was based from Engels who first took the task of showing Marx’s philosophical and 
 
11 Rockmore, Marx after Marxism, 6. 
12 On the origin and development of the scientific point of view in Marxism: Paul 
Thomas, Marxism & Scientific Socialism: From Engels to Althusser Vol. 10 (New York: 
Routledge, 2008). 
13 G.D.H. Cole, The Development of Socialism During the Past Fifty Years (London: 
University of London Press, 1952).  
14 Engels’ dominance during the Internationals is always being noted. John Torrance, 
“Engels and the Marxism of the Second International,” in Karl Marx's theory of ideas 





epistemological views, since Marx’s promise of writing a clear and sustained articulation 
of his epistemology did not materialize.15 Marxists assume that Engels correctly 
understood Marx’s ideas, based on the myth that both are joint authors because of their 
close relation starting in the 1840s. Engels was Marx’s friend, closest collaborator, and an 
important source of financial help. Both also collaborated in the famous works, such as 
the German Ideology and Communist Manifesto, which advocate their political program 
to emancipate man from the injustices of the industrial society. The popularity of Engels’ 
interpretation to the Marxists is further increased by Engels’ easy literary style that is 
more conducive and understandable for reading rather than Marx’s own philosophical 
prose.16 
Engels published his theoretical views in Anti-Dühring and more importantly in 
the Feuerbach and the Classical Conception of Philosophy.17 In these texts, he describes 
Marx as a realist based on his materialist reading of his philosophy. As a materialist, 
Marx is viewed as holding the idea that the ontological status of reality is matter and 
neither spirit nor idea. Engels built a realist epistemology based on this materialism, as it 
implies that matter independently existing from human mind can be only theoretically 
grasped by mentally copying the independent matter. With his articulation of 
materialism, has provided rudiments for the Marxists dialectical materialism and the 
 
15 Allen Wood, “Philosophical Materialism,” in Karl Marx (New York: Routledge, 2005), 
165-194. Wood’s reading often cites Engels and even justifies Engels’ interpretation. 
16 Rockmore, Marx after Marxism, 9. 
17 Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1946); Friedrich Engels, “Anti-Dühring,” in Karl Marx Frederick 





realist interpretation of Marx. His reading points out that the dialectical logic is an 
independent law that governs reality, which means that, as he explains, the whole 
discovery of dialectical movement is a reflection of how nature actually exists in reality. 
The dialectical law is not a subject-dependent law but an objective law independent of the 
human mind: “dialectic of concepts itself” are “merely the conscious reflex of the 
dialectical motion of the real world.”18    
But Engels’ realist epistemology, which was influential to the Marxists, cannot be 
ascribed to Marx. Engels and Marx are two different thinkers. Although the two 
collaborated in some works, it does not follow that both held the same views. For 
example, Engels holds a clear concept that materialism is the view that matter is the 
fundamental reality but it is less clear in Marx. Marx even criticizes certain type of 
materialism, because it lacks the active subjective side of practice and views that reality 
is merely a form of “object” for “contemplation,” a reality that can be described but 
cannot be changed. In the Theses, Marx positions himself against materialism. For him, 
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach 
included—is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of 
the object or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not 
subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to 
materialism, was developed by idealism-but only abstractly, since, of course, 
idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. 19 
 
More importantly, Engels’ and Marxist’s view of Marx were developed out of the 
limited works of the philosopher, since their conception of Marx was already established 
 
18 Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, 2.  
19 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker 





before the publication of Marx’s important philosophical writings, such as, the Theses on 
Feuerbach, Grundrisse, and Manuscripts of 1844. Aside from that, there were also 
political issues involved in the publication of Marx’s writings. Marx’s writings and its 
translation were being suppressed when its views contradict the official view of Marx by 
political Marxists. Some translations were even modified to support the view of the 
official Marxism.20 Both reasons show the inadequate knowledge of Engels and the 
Marxists in their articulation of what they consider as Marx’s philosophy. 
Given the condition in which Marx’s philosophy and his view on knowledge have 
been articulated, the question of Marx’s epistemology – what is Marx’s epistemological 
position as derived from his actual texts and not from Engels’ and Marxism’s primer?– 
remains pressing. Addressing this issue, this work partly contributes in answering the 
question by showing the epistemology of Marx as established in the Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. This work addresses the lack of literature that closely 
treats the epistemology of the Manuscript in view of its concepts that emerged in its 
distinct context. Commonly, the Manuscripts were read in conjunction with the other 
writings of Marx, where its claims were used to merely support Marx’s claims from his 
 
20 Dick Howard, “On Deforming Marx: The French Translation of ‘Grundrisse,’” Science 
and Society 33, no. 3 (1969): 364. An example for this case is the French translation of Marx’s 
Grundrisse. In the article, On Deforming Marx: The French Translation of Grundrisse, the author 
argues that the translation falsifies the text to fit in to “The Party’s” view of Marx and make it 
readable. As the author points out: “This ‘concern’ for the readability of the text is important. But 
the translator tries to make it even more readable by making it fit into pre- conceived notions of 
‘Marxism’- or rather, into what seem at times to be ‘The Party's’ views on what Marx should 
have said! This is a harsh indictment. Yet, the further one reads, the more evident it becomes that 
the translation is not simply inaccurate, but that there is a deliberate falsification of the text in a 
distinct direction. This is not a result of reading Marx's nineteenth-century German with 






other writings or to back up an overall interpretation of Marx’s epistemological views of 
Marx.21 Both approaches, however, have problems in terms of showing what the actual 
claims of the Manuscripts. 
The extent of the study is certainly small, given its focus on a single text of Marx. 
But this humble scope aims to articulate an aspect of Marx’s epistemological view, which 
could contribute in understanding Marx’s overall view on knowledge. The importance of 
focusing in the Manuscripts cannot be exaggerated, since clarifying its epistemological 
view highlights the thoughts of Marx that are absent in Marxism’s and Engels’ 
appropriation but are crucial in the development of his philosophizing. In accomplishing 
this task, the work recovers Marx’s ideas lost because of the confusion emerges out of the 
popularity of Marxism and the issues on the late publication of his texts, which includes 
the Manuscripts.  
The Manuscripts are among Marx’s writings crucial in his epistemology, yet these 
texts were absent in Engels’ and Marxism’s interpretation of Marx. The first publication 
of the Manuscripts appeared in 1929 more than three decades after Engels’ death, when 
the conception of realist Marx was already established.22 In the English speaking world, 
its first English version was published 1959 when there were already established 
interpretation of Marx. Fromm refers to this issue of late publication of the Manuscripts 
 
21 This reading is observable in the readings of Wood, Kolakowski, Myers, and Bender. 
Wood, “Philosophical Materialism,”165-194; Leszek Kolakowski, “Karl Marx and the Classical 
Definition of Truth,” in Toward a Marxist Humanist (New York: Grove, 1968), 38-66; Myers, 
“Marx’s Concept of Truth: A Kantian Interpretation,” 315-326; Bender, “Marx, Materialism and 
the Limits of Philosophy,” 79-100. 





as one of the reasons why Marx’s philosophy was misunderstood in the English speaking 
countries.23 
  The importance of the Manuscripts in understanding Marx’s epistemology is 
evident on the significant number of its passages that express Marx’s view on knowledge. 
Kolakowski thus is right in his advice that the texts should be appreciated not only on 
their concept of alienation but also on their “epistemological content.”24 Besides the 
popular concept of alienation, the Manuscripts also contain how Marx supports the 
naturalism and humanism of Feuerbach. This idea is important for Fromm, because it 
makes evident that Marx is a naturalist and humanist and not a materialist as how 
Marxism commonly understood him. This naturalism and humanism, for Fromm, fought 
the type of “mechanical, ‘bourgeois’ materialism,” which is, as he quoted Marx, the 
“abstract materialism of natural science that excludes history and its process”25 Aside 
from Feuerbach’s ideas, the Manuscripts also contain Marx’s critique of political 
economy and Hegel’s concept of cognition elaborated in the Phenomenology, where 
Marx provides some discussion on concept of science, theory, and cognition.26  The texts, 
as what is shown later, also have some of Marx’s explicit articulations of his views on 
truth, knowledge, objectivity, and consciousness, which have been cited by both realist 
and idealist scholars of Marx to establish their interpretation of Marx’s epistemology. 
 
23 Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, 5. 
24 Kolakowski, “Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth,” 38-66.  
25 Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, 9. 
26 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” in Karl Marx Early Writings 





  The Manuscripts, however, are being questioned on the quality of its content, 
since it is intended as Marx’s first draft.27 The texts are best described as part of Marx’s 
Paris notes and his studies during his stay in Paris from 1843 to 1845.28 Because of its 
condition, the Manuscripts contain Marx’s thoughts at the nascent period: its writing is 
rough and sketchy, and its topics digress from one to another. It also contains lengthy 
quotations, a characteristic of a work, which, as Musto describes, is a “position in 
movement,”29 a writing that is in a thinking process since the texts were drafted at the 
period when Marx was still searching for his own stand and voice. Because of the quality 
of its writing, the Manuscripts are being doubted on whether ideas are worth studying 
and whether it could represent Marx’s thinking. Its critique on political economy is 
charged as an incomplete attempt to criticize political economy and its analysis of 
Hegel’s speculative philosophy is criticized as a misinterpretation of Hegel’s dialectics 
and concept of alienation.30  
  Aside from its sloppy writing, the Manuscripts are also beset with editorial 
concerns, because the texts were not ready for publication and had been long hidden in 
 
27A description of the Manuscripts is provided by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Marx 
& Engels Collected Works Vol. 3 Karl Marx March 1843 – August 1844 (New York: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1980), 598. 
 
28 Cf. Marcello Musto, “Marx in Paris: Manuscripts and Notebooks of 1844,” 
Communications, trans. Patrick Camiller, Science & Society 73, no. 3 (July 2009): 386-402.  
29 Ibid., 392.  
30 Rockmore, Marx after Marxism, 45; Michael Evans, “Karl Marx's First Confrontation 






Marx’s desk.31 The texts are troubled by missing pages, titles, and questionable structure. 
Because of this condition, their first publication in the Marx-Engels Gaustambede 
(MEGA) in 1932, close to five decades after Marx’s death, is produced out of some 
editorial decisions and contributions. The second Manuscript, for instance, misses large 
portion of its text, since the editors only recovered pages 40 to 43 of the second 
Manuscripts, which means that these pages are part of a 43-paged notebook, and there are 
39 missing pages. Aside from the missing parts, the titles of the Manuscripts are also 
merely added by its editors. Marx only added the roman numerals page numbers.  But the 
editors further added the title Heft II and Heft III to the second and third Manuscripts, 
since Marx has only ascribed the title Heft I to the first manuscript.32  
  There is also a great concern about the overall structure of the Manuscripts, 
especially on the arrangements of its parts.33 The final version of the Manuscripts was 
produced partly from its editorial reconstruction.  The editors decided the order of its 
sections, because the Manuscripts were structured in an unusual form of discontinuous 
writing. The texts were not written in a continuous flow in a single notebook, rather its 
first 27 pages were divided into three columns, with the title Wages of labour, Profit of 
Capital, and Rent of Land, each title referring to Smith’s Wealth of Nations. There were 
 







also editorial problems in the first 41 pages of the third Manuscript, as Marx often 
digressed from one subject to another.34    
  But despite these concerns, the Manuscripts remain to be a crucial text in 
understanding Marx’s thinking and his epistemology. The texts’ publication, as Althusser 
acknowledges, is a “real event.”35 Rockmore also maintains that although Marx’s 
writings here is less developed, the Manuscripts are still important texts, since “...taken as 
a whole, this collection of texts [the Manuscripts] provides an astonishingly mature, more 
developed discussion which, [...] has become central to understanding Marx’s position. It 
is a text, he continues, “of great power and originality, marking the place early in his 
writings where Marx, only several years after receiving his doctorate in philosophy, has 
already found a fresh and original voice.”36 Rockmore’s descriptions of the Manuscripts 
are no exaggerations. The texts’ discovery and publication have opened fresh insight to 
Marx’s philosophy, which was dominated by Marxist interpretation. The Manuscripts’ 
concepts of man and alienation have provided a starting point for the development of 
Marxian humanism and existentialism in Marx’s philosophy.37 In reference to the 
Manuscripts’ claims, Marx is interpreted as calling for a humane society reacting against 
the dehumanization of capitalism. These existentialist and humanistic insights from Marx 
are crucial especially because Marx’s philosophy is being identified with the violence 
 
34 Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” 127. 
35 Louis Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism,” in For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (New 
York: Verso, 2005), 155. 
36 Rockmore, Marx after Marxism, 54-55. 





committed by the various Marxist movements.38 Marxian humanists and existentialists 
offer alternative readings of Marx that challenges the simplified interpretation of his 
philosophy based from Engels and Marxism.39 
  More importantly, the Manuscripts are critically important works, because they 
contain Marx’s first attempt to lay the ground for his new thinking more concerned with 
socio-economic condition.40 These writings stand as a crucial turning point in the overall 
development of Marx’s philosophy brought by his Paris experience. Before 1844, Marx 
was still a student of metaphysics and philosophy and Hegelian philosophy had been his 
concern. But after a year, within his three years stay in Paris, he would be developing 
something in his outlook as he would be in the process of giving birth to a thinking that 
uncovers the ground of the estranged society.41 Marx’s Paris experience served as a 
fertile ground for the turning point and transformation of his philosophy. His stay in 
Paris, as Struik describes, would turn Marx, an “academic metaphysician clothed in an 
obscure technical language,” into a philosopher that would carry the “theory that would 
shake the world, and carry a message not only understandable by the fisherman and the 
peasant, the industrial worker and the student, but also one calling them into action.”42 
 
38 Ibid., viii and  6. 
39 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Search for a Method, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Vintage, 
1968); Mark Poster, “Existential Marxism in Postwar France: From Sartre to 
Althusser,” Telos 1976, no. 30 (1976): 224-226; Norman McLeod, “Existential Freedom in the 
Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre,” Dialogue 7, no. 1 (1968): 26-44. 
40 Marx and Engels, Marx & Engels Collected Works Vol. 3, 598. 
41 Musto, “Marx in Paris: Manuscripts and notebooks of 1844,” 386-402. 
42 Dirk J. Struik, “Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,” Science & Society 27, 





  The Manuscripts carry a Marx’s novel thinking that addresses the problems of his 
time. Particularly, they contain Marx’s first encounter of the science of political 
economy, his discussions of the alienated condition of the proletariat, his account of its 
resolution through communism. The texts also include Marx’s critical engagements of the 
important ideas of the period such as his reappraisal of Feuerbach’s naturalism and 
humanism and his critical reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology and its speculative 
philosophy.43 
   The rich content of the Manuscripts has become a space where various 
interpretations of Marx’s epistemology have risen.44 In general, two competing readings 
of the epistemology of the text have been proposed: the first reads the texts as having a 
realist epistemology, which asserts that the characteristics of reality that human beings 
know exist independently outside of the human subject; and the second interprets the 
work as having an idealist epistemology, which views that the characteristics of reality 
that human beings know are dependent and constructed by the human subject. 
  Different scholars have been using different passages from the Manuscripts to 
establish their interpretation of Marx’s epistemology. Kolakowski, for instance, 
suggested that Marx in the Manuscripts expresses an idealist epistemology by inferring 
from the concept of “humanized nature” Marx developed in the text.45 He underscored 
that the humanization of nature involves cognitive behaviour where human being 
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modifies and categorizes nature to satisfy human needs. This point suggests that for Marx 
nature is cognitively understood and organized in accordance with how it could best 
satisfy human beings. Kolakowski interpreted that the epistemology of Marx involved 
“[t]he assimilation of the external world, which is at first biological, subsequently social 
and therefore human,” and this assimilation occurs as “an organization of the raw 
material of nature in an effort to satisfy needs.” 46 For Kolakowski, Marx thinks that 
human beings assimilate the world by organizing its objects cognitively to satisfy their 
needs. 47 
  Aside from Kolakowski’s idealist reading of the Manuscripts, Wood reads the 
same text differently as expressing a realist epistemology by emphasizing the text’s 
assertion of “ontological objectivity of nature.”48 With this concept, he interprets Marx in 
the lines of Engels’ realist reading asserting that Marx also “avows a vulgar realist 
position very bluntly.”49 He further underscored that Marx’s texts are best interpreted as 
asserting that knowledge is based from the independent reality rather than knowledge 
dependent to man, because “the objects of human consciousness and human drives ‘exist 
outside [the human being] as objects independent of him.”50   
  To further support his realist reading, Wood cites how Lukács’ encounter of the 
Manuscripts and its concept of objectivity of nature had changed his initial idealist 
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conception of Marx.51 In History and Class Consciousness, Lukács is renowned to 
pioneer an idealist reading of Marx based on emphasizing the influence of the Hegelian 
dialectical categories in his philosophy. The claims in the History and Class 
Consciousness, however, were recanted after Lukács’ encounter with the Manuscripts. In 
his words, his reading of the Manuscripts in 1930s “swept to one side” his “idealist 
prejudices” of Marx. He explained that Manuscripts’ assertion that “objectivity was the 
primary material attribute of all things and relations...completely shattered the theoretical 
foundations” of his Hegelian reading of Marx.52 What he was referring at are the parts of 
the Manuscripts where Marx emphasizes the objectivity of things, which indicate Marx’s 
leaning to realist rather than idealist epistemology. 
  In view of the debate over the Manuscripts’ view on knowledge, this work argues 
that the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 express an idealist epistemology 
as their claims suggest that our knowledge of reality is subject-dependent. Knowledge, as 
the Manuscripts express, is grounded not only on the independent reality existing outside 
the subject, but further shaped by the type of subject’s need dominant in a particular 
society. 
This form of idealism being ascribed to the Manuscripts must not be confused 
with the other concepts of idealism, such as the uncritical idealism Marx adamantly 
criticized in the Manuscripts. The first chapter of this work “The Question of Marx’s 
Epistemology and the Conflation of Idealisms” clarifies this confusion in the term 
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“idealism.” It tackles the difficulties of how the term “idealism” is inconsistently used in 
the discussions of Marx’s epistemology, and then delineates between ontological and 
epistemological idealism. This chapter explains that the notion of idealism that is being 
ascribed to Marx is epistemological and should be understood in the context of the 
development of Kant of Post-Kantian tradition. Epistemological Idealism’s assertion that 
knowledge is in some sense constructed by the subject is clearly different from the realist 
understanding of idealism mainly as an ontological assertion that says that the 
fundamental reality is idea. Epistemological idealism is also different from the 
Berkeleyan idealism that views that mind creates reality, because this idealism neither 
suggests that idea is the fundamental reality nor idea is the creator of reality. 
The Epistemological idealism being argued in this work is based on the method of 
reading the Manuscripts on its own terms and in its own context. This reading is 
important to underscore given that there are problematic approaches that impede the 
proper understanding of the text. The second chapter, “The Manuscripts and the 
Reductive Readings of Marx,” discusses the issues about the proper approach to the 
Manuscripts. It precisely addresses the issue on how the texts are read reductively in 
view of the later works of Marx and of the assumption of a “unified Marx,” i.e. that 
there’s an overall unity in Marx’s philosophy. Addressing these issues, the chapter shows 
that the Manuscripts should be read on its own context, because this approach focuses on 
understanding what the texts actually have to say, avoiding the problem of reducing the 






After clarifying idealism and addressing the issue of how to read the Manuscripts, 
the third chapter, “The Epistemology of the Manuscripts,” is focused on showing the 
Manuscripts’ idealist view on knowledge. This chapter sets this assertion in the context 
of Marx’s relation to Hegel and Feuerbach. It shows how Marx is criticizing Hegel’s idea 
while affirming Feuerbach’s naturalist-humanism. The epistemology of the Manuscripts 
is contextualized on how Marx discovers the human and natural ground of cognition like 
how Feuerbach has revealed the natural foundation of the idea God in the natural needs 
of man. 
After the context is set, the third chapter argues that Marx holds an idealist 
epistemology in the Manuscripts by showing that: (1) Marx views the cognition of reality 
as subject-dependent, where knowledge is understood as a human construction out of 
their need that emerge in a particular society. Knowledge is conceived out of Marx’s 
discussion on how an object is dependent on the subject’s need; (2) Marx’s critique of 
political economy in the Manuscripts highlights the texts’ idealist epistemology. The 
critique reveals the subjective dependence of certain science – in this case, political 
economy – in the needs dominant in a certain social condition. Marx, for instance, 
identifies this estranged need of private property as what shapes the claims of political 
economy. 
As the idealist epistemology of the Manuscripts has been established, the 
succeeding parts of the third chapter are tasked to further clarify Marx’s idealism. They 
address the issues on the thing-in-itself and the realist reading of the Manuscripts. The 
section, “The Dissolution of the thing-in-itself in Practical Standpoint,” shows that 





have any concept of thing-in-itself. This section further discusses the similarities and 
differences between Kant’s idealism and Marx’s version of it. Aside from the issue of 
thing-in-itself, the section “The Errors of the Realist Reading of the Manuscripts” 
addresses the arguments of the realist reading of the text, because they contradict the 
textual evidence given in the Manuscripts and simplifies the categories where Marx’s 
view is only read between the concept of uncritical idealism and realism.  
This study concludes by emphasizing the revolutionary implication of the 
Manuscripts’ epistemology. In the last section, “The Revolutionary Cognition: the 
Manuscripts’ Role in Changing the Society,” it underscores that the recognition of how 
the subjective condition affects the subjects’ cognition calls for a redirection of science. 
Marx suggests that sciences and theories must not be simply understood as a pursuit to 
discover what is out there. Given the Manuscripts’ idealist epistemology, the concerns of 
cognition must be redirected so that it is driven to realize the essential needs of the human 
being and to direct its inquiries to the practical concern of man. Hence, to provide a more 
humane cognition, Marx is not advocating that our knowledge should provide an exact 
copy of an objective reality, what he is rather aspiring is the redirection of our cognition 












The term “idealism” itself is ambiguous given its rich philosophical history, 
which can be found in the writings of Plato, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel and others.53 These 
philosophers have used the term differently, depending on their own context, view, and 
intention. Its various usages range from the assertion that the fundamental reality is idea; 
or the aspiration for a better world; or the contention that ideas are primary over matter. 
As what will be presented in this chapter, the ambiguity of this term remains even when 
employed in the discussion of Marx’s view on knowledge, which includes the 
epistemology of the Manuscripts. In general, the debate whether Marx holds an idealist 
or a realist epistemology shows the different senses where the term idealism is used and 
highlights how it is inconsistently employed in the discussion of Marx’s epistemology. 
Thus, the clarification of the term is necessary, as it illuminates the discussion of Marx’s 
view on knowledge. 
In surveying the debate on Marx’s epistemology, the term idealism plays a critical 
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role in establishing the distinct positions in the discussion. The Marxian idealists54, for 
instance, conceives the concept of idealism as the interpretation to defend, while the 
Marxian realists55 think of the idea of idealism as the position to contrast their reading.  
The realist Marx articulates the concept to show why their realist interpretation is more 
acceptable than the other readings of his text.  
The same sense of importance for this term can be also seen in readings the 
Manuscripts. Not only that the idea provides Marx’s scholars a conceptual tool to grasp 
what Marx meant in his text, the term is even mentioned by Marx himself in his text to 
describe the thinking he criticizes and even perceives in moribund state. This Idealism, 
for him, connotes the loss of the empirical world at the expense of the world of ideas. He 
explicitly conceives the term as “uncritical idealism” he identifies to the Young 
Hegelians.56 
Addressing the ambiguity of the term, this chapter clarifies the idealisms that have 
emerged in the debate on Marx’s epistemology: ontological and epistemological 
idealism. Ontological idealism57  claims that idea is the fundamental reality, while 
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epistemological idealism58  suggests that knowledge is dependent upon the subject, which 
means that the subject, in some sense, constructs the characteristics of the known reality.  
Given the two concepts of idealism, this chapter elucidates that Marxian idealists 
precisely defend the epistemological than the ontological. This clarification is important 
to avoid the tendency of realist Marx to simplify idealism merely as an ontological claim 
and to untangle the confusions in the conflated understanding of the two senses of 
idealism, which besets the debate on Marx’s epistemology. In the end, although this 
chapter distinguishes the epistemological idealism from the other senses of idealism, it 
does not suggest that it is the correct epistemology of Marx. It merely sets the terms of 
debate and shows the actual meaning of these senses of idealism so that they are not 
rejected out of misinterpretation. 
 
Epistemological Idealism 
The first idealism to be discussed can be termed as epistemological idealism. This 
idealism holds a constructivist view on knowledge, which claims that what we know is in 
some sense produced or constructed by the subject. It holds that knowledge is subject-
dependent, which means that it is constructed or modified by the subject. This idealism 
appears in the readings of Marx’s epistemology by Kolakowski, Avinerri, and Lukács 
who suggest that knowledge is in some sense a human construct. 
 
as referring to Berkeley’s philosophical position that negatively answers the philosophical 
question: “Does a natural world that is independent of human beings exist?”  
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Epistemological idealism can be traced from Kant’s critical philosophy that 
culminated in a shift – akin to Copernican revolution. Kant shifted the source of 
knowledge from the object being reflected to the subject to subject constructing what can 
be known. Contrary to the Aristotelian epistemology commonly held during that time, 
Kant reconceived knowing from the Aristotelian idea that the object is the source of 
knowledge to the idea that subject is the ground of knowledge. Kant’s philosophy is 
concerned with the transcendental logic, which intends to inquire on the condition of 
knowledge as produced by the subject. By focusing on this inquirty, he conceives that 
human knowledge is limited to phenomena, i.e. to what is sensed and conceptualized by 
the faculties of consciousness and not to noumena i.e. to what the reality actually is.  
German Idealism took the Kantian epistemological view and extended it to 
complete and deepen Kant’s Copernican revolution. The ahistorical transcendental 
subject of Kant was criticized by Hegel and turned into a historical subject.59 He 
contended that we should realize that subjects are social beings who are products of the 
historical development of social reason. Post-Kantian idealists and more importantly 
Hegel historicized the subject and showed that the condition of knowledge is not 
universal but historical.  
There are differences in Kant and the Post-Kantian tradition, but both remains 
epistemological idealists in so far that both holds a constructivist view of knowledge, 
where knowledge is in some sense constructed and produced by the subject.  This form of 
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idealism should be distinguished from the idealism that aspires for a better – or ideal 
reality – from the present poor and unjust condition. Although Marx is driven with this 
goal, as he seeks for the emancipation from a dehumanized society and aims for a better 
political and economic condition, this idealism just the popular sense of the term often 
related to being optimistic and clearly not epistemological.  
Epistemological Idealism is also different from Berkeley’s idealism, which 
conceives that reality is based on perception. Berkeley famously remarks that “to be is to 
be perceived,” which means that the mind creates reality on the moment of its perception. 
The ultimate mind for Berkeley is God, a being who perceives, thus creates, everything, 
even things that are imperceptible to human mind.  This form of idealism, which is said 
to have been adopted by the British Idealists such as F.H. Bradley, was rejected by a long 
line of 20th century analytic thinkers, including Bertrand Russell and the late 
Wittgenstein.  
Contrary to Berkeley’s idealism, epistemological idealism no way asserts that 
mind can ultimately create reality. Epistemological idealism only maintains that the 
subject modifies what it can know, but it does not assert that the mind has the capacity to 
create existence for it can only modify the perception of an already existing reality. 
Hence, epistemological idealism should be differentiated from ontological 
idealism. Ontological idealism asserts that the nature of reality is fundamentally idea, 
which is often contrasted with materialism, which views the reality as fundamentally 
matter. Although there is an interpretation that epistemological idealism implies 
ontological idealism, since a subject-dependent-knowledge could suggest that even the 





idealism by itself, as a claim about knowledge, does not necessarily lead to ontological 
idealism. Epistemological idealism only maintains a subject-dependent-knowledge, 
which is clearly not an ontological idealist assertion.60 
 
The Conflation of Idealisms in the Realist Reading 
It is important to distinguish epistemological idealism from the ontological 
version of the term, since the lack of delineation between these two idealisms does not 
only lead to misinterpretation of the two idealisms but also to a lack of appreciation of 
idealism primarily in the epistemological sense, which what the Marxian idealists are 
proposing. This problem, which is what argued in this chapter, plagues the realist reading 
of Marx, as they fail to clearly draw distinction between the two conceptions of the term. 
The realists limitedly define idealism only as an ontological claim, without 
acknowledging the epistemological sense of the term. This neglect of the concept of 
epistemological idealism weakens their realist reading of Marx, since they fail to provide 
a correct counter-argument against the proposed idealist reading. 
Before expounding on how the realists conflate idealisms, there are important 
things that first need to be said on their ideas. The realist reading of Marx focuses on his 
epistemology and it asserts that knowledge for Marx independently exists outside of the 
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subject. In this reading, knowledge of the characteristics of reality is not subject-
dependent but independently existing outside of the knower. The famous proponents of 
this reading are Engels and the Marxists, which includes Plekhanov, Lenin, and Mao. For 
these thinkers, Marx holds the view that knowledge is produced as the subject’s mind 
copies the independent structure of the reality. They emphasize that reality independently 
exists outside of the subject and knowing it means it should be copied on the subject’s 
mind.61 
In the discussion of the realists, the term idealism plays a critical role in their 
reading, as their conception of its meaning provides them the position to contrast their 
own reading of Marx’s epistemology. They contend and engage with their idea of 
idealism to show why the realist interpretation is more acceptable than the other readings 
of his text. Most of the realist readings of  
The realist Marx’s conception, however, restricts idealism only in its ontological 
sense without any hint of its epistemological sense proposed by the idealist Marx. This 
limited articulation of the concept of idealism is evident in Engel’s realist appropriation 
of Marx’s claims, which has influenced most of the succeeding realist readings of Marx. 
In Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Engels confines 
idealism in its ontological sense. He describes the idealists as “those who asserted the 
primacy of spirit to nature,” and thinks that the creation of the world is out from the 
mind, idea, or God. For Engels, idealism simply means that ideas, and not matter, are the 
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fundamental reality; ideas are the cause of matter and not the other way around.  This 
concept of Idealism, for Engels, is one of the philosophers’ major answers to the greatest 
question of philosophy, the question concerning the relation of “thinking and being.” 
Philosophers have been divided into two major camps: the materialists who assert the 
primacy of being and the idealists who assert the primacy of thinking.62  
As Engels limits the sense of idealism ontologically, he then concludes that Marx 
does not adopt any form of idealism. Out of his simplistic distinction, he notes that 
Marx’s philosophy should be distanced from idealism and should be understood as 
primarily influenced by Feuerbach’s materialism, which does not hold that ideas are 
primary cause of reality but matter. This materialism, for Engels, is the ground of Marx’s 
assertion that reality can be explained through the material objective economic condition.  
Through this framework, Marx resolves the theoretical contradictions of idealism by 
showing that its root is nothing but a form of theology, which is a baseless assertion 
because it is grounded on the fantastic survival of the belief in the existence of an extra-
mundane creator.63 
Engels’ distinction between materialism and idealism has become popular among 
the Marxists and turned out as the basis for their succeeding interpretations. Part of its 
popularity was its utter simplicity in its distinction of both concepts. Materialism is 
defined as the assertion that matter causes ideas, and idealism is conceived as the view 
that idea causes matter.  Aside from this factor, Marx’s lack of systematic discussion of 
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his epistemological views greatly contributes as to why his scholars rely heavily on 
Engels’ ideas on materialism and idealism.64 Both Plekhanov and Lenin, for instance, 
follows Engels’ limited concept of idealism, which also lead them to reject the idea that 
Marx holds any form of idealism, including the epistemological sense of the concept. 
Engels’ influence binds their view of idealism as contrasted to materialism, which is only 
the ontological sense of the term. 
Plekhanov, for instance, conceives idealism as distinct from Marx’s materialism. 
For him, Hegel’s idealism and Kant’s transcendental idealism reduce everything into 
thought, as both conceive “being, matter, and nature” as either postulate of “Idea” (for 
Hegel) or of “Reason” (for Kant). Both Kant and Hegel’s ideas, for Plekhanov, are 
closely akin to a “theological concept,” which is the view that “nature was created by 
God,” or “reality, matter,” is created by “an abstract, non-material being,” or “world’s 
law is dictated [...] by divine Reason.”65 In both senses, it means that the reality is created 
by mind. 
Lenin, same with Plekhanov, also defines materialism against the backdrop of 
idealism, but he calls it as the Empirico-criticism, which is held be Mach and Avenarius. 
For Lenin, Empirico-criticism has cloaked the idealism of Berkeley, as it remains 
grounded on the idea that existence is created by perception, esse est percipii. Lenin 
criticizes this form idealism because of its absurd logical consequence. Berkeley’s 
idealism’s end point is solipsism, since when everything is conceived as one’s personal 
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idea based on personal perception, then even the existence of human beings becomes a 
mere product of one’s idea. In his ironic remark, he expresses this view that “if bodies are 
‘complexes of sensations’ …or ‘combinations of sensations’ as Berkeley said, it 
inevitably follows that the whole world is but my idea.” 66 
Engel’s realist influence has extended even in the recent readings of Marx made 
by Allen Wood in Philosophical Materialism, which is a section in his book on Marx. 
Wood follows the same notion of idealism set by Engels and even defends Engels’ 
distinction between idealism and materialism as correct despite of its inadequacy. He 
argues that “Engels’ rather Manichean distinction between idealism and materialism may 
be a simplistic and philosophically unsophisticated, but it is not wholly misguided.”67 
Engels’ real purpose is to aid us delineate the concept and by defining the categories 
simplistically, he made a clear distinction between the materialist outlook from the 
“traditional religious outlook” and supernatural explanations.68 
Wood’s support of Engels` categories is his ground why he disassociates Marx 
from any form of idealism. He also dismisses Marxian idealist account because following 
Engels, the very concept of idealism gives him an impression that it is related to some 
supernatural view. Wood’s Engels-like argument points out that Marx cannot be 
identified with idealism, given that idealism is a Hegelian notion where “nature is 
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‘posited’ by cosmic spirit as its ‘externalization’.”69 Idealists maintain that “God created 
the world,” and “the separation of soul dwelling in the body and leaving it at death,” 
which no way can be identified as Marx’s ideas.70 
 Contrary to idealism, Wood reads that it is more plausible that Marx is read as a 
naturalist and a realist. He grounds this realist reading on the assertion that Marx 
embraces “historical materialism,” a view that “rests on the idea that the deepest and 
most historically potent human interests lie in developing people’s natural powers to 
shape the world, and not in looking after the supernatural destination of their souls.”71 It 
means that Marx is neither a supernaturalist nor a mystic, and this philosophical view 
brings him closer to materialism and realism. 
Closely analyzing the categories of Engels, however, reveals that his simplistic 
conceptual distinction is no longer reliable when one aims to clarify the nuanced 
epistemology of Marx. The categories, which are set by Engels, limit the possible reading 
of Marx, since it is focused only on the extremes of idealism and materialism without the 
intermediate views available. Engels only chooses between the primacy of thought and 
primacy of being as mutually exclusive alternatives. As a result, he fails to discuss any 
form of epistemological idealism, which is different from the concept of idealism he is 
espousing. He lacks an articulation of idealism that originated from Kant, and if he has 
ever mentioned him, it is in the context of interpreting the philosopher as an agnostic who 
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thought the reality is unknown. Kant is only viewed on his ontological claim, the view 
that reality is an unknown “noumenal realm,” neglecting his assertion of a subject-
dependent knowledge, his epistemological idealism. 
 
The Difference between Ontological and Epistemological idealism 
The realists are certainly correct that Marx does not hold any form of ontological 
idealism. Even in the Manuscripts, Marx explicitly states that he does not subscribe to the 
view that reality is fundamentally idea; he even refers to it as “uncritical idealism,”72 the 
view where the idea functions as a demiurge that creates the material reality. The realists, 
however, conflate two idealisms into ontological idealism and this should be critically 
checked. The idealism that Marx readers held is different from Marx. 
The realists’ failure to elaborate epistemological idealism has leaded them to an 
unwarranted deduction that Marx should be distanced from any form of idealism. 
Without elaborating the epistemological idealism, the realists have neglected an 
important insight that Marx probably held, which lead them to miss the point of Marxian 
idealists like Kolakowski. For instance, Wood, who reads Marx as a realist, refutes 
ontological idealism and then mistakenly ascribed it as the idealism being held by 
Kolakowski and other Marxian idealists. This tendency of conflating idealisms is 
common in the readings of the realist Marx. 
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The realist conflates ontological idealism with the epistemological idealism of the 
Marxian idealists, because they fail to articulate properly the epistemological idealism. 
What they have critiqued is a simplified and crude interpretation of idealism of Hegel and 
Berkeley, which cannot be identified with the epistemological idealism the Marxian 
idealists defended. As a result, they easily deny Marx of holding any form of idealism, 
without considering the actual arguments of Marxian epistemological idealism. They 
conclude that the most viable interpretation of Marx is materialism and realism, because 
of what they have perceived as Marx’s explicit opposition to ontological idealism. 
Contrary to the Realist Marx, Marxian Idealists cannot be viewed as holding 
supernaturalism and mysticism, which Engels and his followers critique against them. In 
fact, similar to the realist reading, the idealists also deny identification with uncritical 
idealism and Berkeley’s idealism. For instance, Avineri who is a Marxian Idealist reads 
Marx as holding idealism in the epistemological sense but maintaining materialism as an 
ontological view. He explains that although Marx has advanced the idea of the objective 
and independent existence of the material reality, the philosopher manages to maintain 
the idealist epistemology where subjects modify what they perceive.73 
Similar to Avinerri, Lukács reads Marx as an idealist who still maintains the 
existence of an “objective social reality.” For him, although Marx thinks that perception 
of the social reality is dependent on subject’s class (i.e. one’s context and condition), it 
does not mean that the Marxian view thinks that reality is produced by ideas alone or by 
an Absolute or Geist. Both the bourgeois and the proletariat perceive the same reality 
 





immediately (without theoretical constitution), but the mediation of their different class 
standpoint creates a varying perception of reality. As Lukács writes, “…the objective 
reality of social existence is in its immediacy the ‘same’ for both proletariat and 
bourgeoisie. But this does not prevent the specific categories of mediation by means of 
which both classes raise this immediacy to the level of consciousness, by means of which 
the merely immediate reality becomes for both the authentically objective reality, from 
being fundamentally different, thanks to different position occupied by the ‘two’ classes 
within the ‘same’ economic process.” 74 
Like Lukács, Kolakowski reads Marx under the same idealist terms. He clarifies 
that Marx’s epistemology does not assert that the mind literally creates existence of 
things. It conceives that the mind provides a modified perception of reality, yet it never 
denies the existence of things independently. Lukács explains that for Marx “human 
consciousness, the practical mind...does not produce existence” yet this same mind 
“produces existence as composed of individuals divided into species and general.” 75 He 
reiterates that rhe mental concept is different from actual existence. “It does not follow,” 
he adds “that to be “thought of” is the same thing as “to be.” 76 It means that there’s still 
an actual existence of things, which he refers as the “force of opposition,” the reality that 
the human beings must engage and “must overcome” to satisfy their needs. 77 
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Clearly, the Marxian idealists, in a certain sense, maintain the independent 
existence of objects from the subject. Although they see that Marx holds the idea that the 
subject in some sense modifies reality, they make a conscious effort to distinguish 
between the idealism that views a subject-dependent knowledge from the idealism that 
asserts that consciousness produces the reality out of nothing. Contrary to the latter, they 
never deny the existence of things, or reduce their existence into a mere idea. The 
Marxian idealists underscore how Marx re-establishes the objective existence of things 
through his critique of Hegel’s philosophy.  
Moreover, the emphasis of the Marxian idealists on the independent existence of 
things highlights the inconsistency between the conceptions of Marxian idealists and 
realists. It shows that the concept of idealism the realists have refuted is different from 
the idealism the Marxian idealists have defended. The idealism the realists have refuted is 
primarily ontological, while what the Marxian idealists have defended is epistemological. 
Hence, the realists’ discussion fails actually refute the idealist reading of Marx, since they 
miss the point of the epistemological idealism conceived by the Marxian idealists. 
 
Clarifying Idealism 
The confusion in the concept of idealism must be clarified by properly delineating 
the terms of debate. Epistemological idealism must be distinguished from the realist 
notion of idealism, which is usually crude or “uncritical idealism.” This type of idealism 
is what Marx has criticized in the Manuscripts.78 It holds the idea that the mind produces 
 





the existence of reality ex nihilo, which implies the reduction of everything into thought. 
Same with Marx, Engels rejects this version of idealism, which he captures as a view that 
gives primacy to “thinking” over Being. And similar to these two thinkers, both Marxian 
idealists and realists reject uncritical idealism. Both readings do not think that Marx 
suggests that reality is supernaturally created by mind or consciousness. 
As the idea of uncritical idealism becomes clear, then it becomes also clear that 
the epistemological idealism must be differentiated from it. The later does not assert that 
the subject directly creates knowledge and reality, but merely views that the subject 
constructs knowledge. The subject contributes to the construction of knowledge in a 
certain manner. The contribution does not only come from practical labor, e.g. a worker 
transforms wood into table or mountain into a building, but also through cognitive 
activities, that is, by understanding the reality in a set of categories produced by human 
being existing in a specific socio-economic condition.  
The clarification of the notion of epistemological idealism from other idealist 
notion does not establish that this reading is correct. Its task is to address the 
terminological inconsistency, since before one can address the textual problems of Marx, 
the terminological inconsistencies need to be first addressed: the notion of “idealism” 
needs to be clarified in the debate of Marx’s philosophy. The clarification of these 
concepts is essential to correctly approach the Manuscrpts. The confusions should be first 
cleared out, so that the interpretations will not be accepted or denied for wrong reasons. 
In the end, although there are errors in the realist reading on the way they understood the 
concept of idealism, it does not follow that the idealist reading is correct, for the text still 













The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 are critically important 
works where Marx initially worked out the ground for his new thinking through critical 
readings of Feuerbach’s and Hegel’s philosophy. The Manuscripts were written between 
May and October of 1844, four years before the 1848 revolution when Paris was 
experiencing intense political and intellectual developments. During this period, the 25-
year-old Marx entered the city as a young academic who was still searching for his 
original voice. As Musto describes him, Marx at this point bore a “theoretical 
disponibilite,” a theoretical gap produced by Marx’s critical attitude against the Hegelian 
philosophy and its inadequacies to address the real problems in politics and economics.79 
Before his stay in Paris, Marx had been criticizing Hegel’s philosophy because of its 
abstractions and mystifications.  In his lengthy yet incomplete text, Critique of the 
Doctrine of the State, Marx undermined the political categories of Hegel’s philosophy of 
right and showed its abstract and mystical character. This critique is what Marx 
mentioned at the preface of the Manuscripts. He was complaining against the 
supernaturalism ingrained in Hegel’s ideas of the unfolding of the Absolute.  
 





Marx’s brief stay in Paris provided him a fresh theoretical atmosphere, which is 
different from his German home that was dominated by the German Idealists who were 
followers of Hegelian philosophy. Paris, on the other hand, during this period, was 
experiencing constant political agitation among its workers and artisans. The 
intellectuals, in the same spirit, were publishing books, journals, and newspapers, as they 
were living in continuous influence with each other through constant meetings and 
discussions at the cafes, streets, and other public places. This rich atmosphere in Paris 
provided Marx a great support for his intellectual development. His encounter with the 
intellectuals and Parisian working class in their living and working conditions provided 
him important elements for his thinking.80 It provided him a rich context where he would 
develop his ideas based on his first encounter of the science of political economy and 
witness of the alienated condition of the proletariat and its resolution.81 
Addressing the importance of the Manuscripts, this chapter asserts that the texts 
should be read on its own terms and context to appreciate what Marx’s actual views are. 
This kind of approach addresses the problematic tendency to reductively read Marx’s 
early texts, which includes the Manuscripts.  This chapter identifies two types of this 
reductive reading: first is a reductive reading that reduces the concepts and ideas of the 
Manuscripts to the assertions of Marx’s later writings; and second is a reductive reading 
that reduces the meaning of the Manuscripts to an assumed single, overall philosophical 
view of Marx. As what is shown in this chapter, both types are aspects of the actual 
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reductive reading that has been done on Marx’s text; both are intertwined in so far that, in 
the reductive reading of Marx, the presupposed unified philosophy of Marx has been 
based on the readings of his later writings.  
Against the reductive reading of Marx’s texts, this chapter suggests that the 
Manuscripts should be read neither in view of the later writings nor any philosophical 
view. As Manuscripts are critically important texts in the development of Marx’s 
philosophy and in the interpretation of his epistemology, this chapter recommends that 
the texts need to be treated closely and read on their own terms to get, if not the exact, at 
least, their most conceivable and plausible meaning. The Manuscripts should be read in 
the context of Marx’s critical engagements with the philosophy of Hegel and Feuerbach 
and his critique of political economy. A careless reading of these texts is predisposed to 
misread their meaning in view of the later writings or an assumed overall view of Marx, 
which leaves the richness of Marx’s claims in these texts unappreciated. 
 
The Reduction of Early to Later Marx 
The approach to read the Manuscripts on its own terms is a pressing task, since, at 
what this section shows, there are readings that comprehend these texts and its 
epistemological passages outside of its own context, usually in view of Marx’s later 
writings. The reduction of the early to the later works can be seen on Wood’s approach to 
the Manuscripts. He defends that Marx holds realism in the Manuscripts not by referring 
to the claims of the Manuscripts but by using the later works such as Grundrisse and 





“nature…taken abstract for itself is nothing.”82 As he interprets the claim, he explains 
that: 
...even if Marx is expressing his own view when he says that ‘nature...in 
separation from the human being is nothing for the human being’, the most he 
could be saying is that nature is viewed apart from human self-objectification has 
no significance for humans. He is not saying that in the absence of human 
consciousness or labor nature would cease to exist or that it would be ‘an 
undifferentiated chaos, without movement’.83  
 
In Wood’s reading of the passage, he thinks that Marx’s remarks about the relation 
between man and nature should be read under a realist epistemology. For him, nature is 
only dependent to man through labour and not through cognition; knowledge is produced 
as a reflection of an independent nature, and no way shaped or affected by the condition 
of the subject.  
Wood, however, proves this realist reading not by citing the Manuscripts but 
Marx’s later writings. He refers to how Marx in the Grundrisse only speaks of our 
knowledge as “reproducing” the real in thought. Using the Grundrisse, he underscores 
that Marx’s “dialectical method” is a process of “reflecting back ideally the life of the 
material.”84 Aside from the Grundrisse, he also cites the Capital, another later work of 
Marx, to argue that the idealist interpretation of the passages in the Manuscripts “is not 
warranted by any reasonable reading of the metaphors of copying and reflection as Marx 
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and Engels use them.”85 A prominent metaphor in the Capital is Marx’s inversion of 
Hegel, where Hegel is being turned upside down. Engels understands this imagery as a 
declaration of Marx’s materialism and realism, a signal of Marx’s shift from Hegelian 
idealism to a materialist-realist view of the reality. As Engels puts it, when “Hegel's 
dialectic was put on its head, or rather, from its head, on which it was standing, it was put 
on its feet,”86 it suggests that Marx has only adopted the Hegelian dialectical logic 
without subscribing to the idealist ontology being accused to Hegel. For Engels, Marx set 
the dialectical law as based not on mind or ideas but as a component of an independent 
reality. 87 
Wood’s realist reading, as it is founded on an implicit reference to Engels, does 
not actually establish the epistemology of the Manuscripts. Engels’ reading cannot be the 
basis for interpreting the Manuscripts, since he does not have any knowledge of the texts, 
which were unavailable during his time. His understanding of Marx’s epistemology was 
only based on the later works of Marx and on the recent discovery of the Theses during 
his time. Such claim is confirmed by the fact that Engels died on 1895, more than three 
decades before the first publication of the Manuscripts, which appeared on 1932.88 It 
should be also noted that some of Marx’s text, like the Manuscripts, were unavailable in 
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Marx’s early commentators, including Engels.89 Hence Wood’s, based on Engels, is an 
inappropriate reading of the Manuscripts, as like Engels, he casually applies the ideas in 
Marx’s later writings to Marx’s early works such as the Manuscripts. 
More importantly, although the later works such as, Grundrisse and Capital (as 
Engels has interpreted these), could express a certain form of realism, their assertions 
cannot be simply applied to interpret the Manuscripts without taking the texts and its 
context into account. To use the later works to understand the claims in the Manuscripts 
is a reading that neglects the actual claims of the texts, as its passages are interpreted 
outside of its context and not on its own terms. As a result of this reading, Marx’s claims 
in the Manuscripts are unsatisfactorily treated and this kind of interpretation raises doubt 
on whether the later works capture the epistemology of the Manuscripts or not. 
Wood’s improper approach exemplifies a type of reductive reading, where the 
meanings of the passages of the Manuscripts are reduced to the interpretation ascribed to 
his later writings. As a result of this reading, Marx’s early and later writings are 
understood in the same context, without the distinct themes where these texts are 
particularly concerned. The early writings, like the Manuscripts, are read without its 
history, condition, and overall theme, as they are reduced as a mere precursor of Marx’s 
later writings. 
Althusser’s critique against this reading is worth noting given that he has 
indentified its methodical problems. Althusser criticizes this approach as an “eclectic” 
reading of Marx: a "form of reading of Marx’s early writings” which “depends more on 
 





free association of ideas or on a simple comparison of terms than of historical critique.” 90 
For Althusser, this reading indiscriminately combines different passages from Marx’s 
writings to support what they perceive as the mature Marx without noting the textual and 
historical development of the texts.  
As Althusser observes, Marx’s early texts are either read out of the presumption 
of “theory of sources” or a “theory of anticipation,” which means that the early texts are 
understood as to whether they are the source of the concepts that have been developed in 
the later works of Marx, or that the concepts of the early writings anticipates concepts of 
Marx in the later works.  In both presumptions, the young Marx—including the 
Manuscripts—is understood in view of the later Marx. As a result, the debate on 
interpreting Marx is reduced on whether “the young Marx is not Marx; or that the young 
Marx is Marx.” It means that this reading decomposes Marx, as the philosopher’s text is 
reduced into what is already materialist and what is still idealist.91  
This reduction of Marx’s early texts to his later works is shown to be a 
problematic reading, especially in understanding the epistemology of the Manuscripts. 
The claims in the Manuscripts are not understood on its own but filtered or worst 
neglected because of the later Marx. As a result, this reading raises the question on: 
whether the claims in Marx’s later works can be simply applied to the Manuscripts? The 
answer is it cannot be uncritically applied, since both writings are set in different time 
and context in Marx’s philosophizing. The issue on whether there’s a break or continuity 
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in Marx’s text needs to be settled first before one can conclusively apply the claims of the 
later writings to the early works of Marx such as the Manuscripts.   
For the meantime, what can be reasonably claim, given the scope of this work, is 
about what the Manuscripts actual claims are, and the best approach is to read them on 
their own terms and context. Reading the texts on this manner allows its readers to 
interpret its claims fairly. This approach is what the third chapter of this work attempts. 
Unlike Wood’s reductive reading that interprets Manuscripts’ claim that, “nature…taken 
abstract for itself is nothing”92 in realist sense by using the later works of Marx, this 
passage is interpreted in view of the other concepts Marx’s articulated in the 
Manuscripts, which proves that this claim expresses idealism rather than realism. 
 
The Reduction of Marx to a “Unified Marx” 
Aside from the questionable reading of the Manuscripts from the perspective of 
Marx’s later writings, another reductive form of reading the Manuscripts is by 
understanding its claims with a presupposition that there’s a single epistemological view 
that runs across Marx’s works. A reading of the Manuscripts done under this assumption 
is questionable, since it is not a good starting point to ground one’s interpretation on a 
debatable idea that Marx has a single epistemological view across his works. This 
assumption must be proven to have credence, and it can only be conclusive after studying 
the entirety of Marx’s corpus. It means that one cannot just claim a unified Marx, since 
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there’s always a possibility that Marx does not have a single and unified view but rather 
varying epistemologies that have been developing in the progress of his writings. It is 
always possible that the Manuscripts, given their own setting and concepts, have an 
epistemology different from Marx’s other writings. 
 The reading that assumes that Marx has a single and unified epistemology across 
his works prevents a proper understanding of the view of the Manuscripts.  Kain 
criticizes this assumption on what he termed as the “unified Marx.” He cites, for instance, 
the subjective idealist scholars of Marx as neglecting the shifts in Marx’s thinking by 
assuming that Marx holds idealism in the totality of his works. For Kain, their reading 
neglects the changes in Marx’s thoughts from the early works, such as the Manuscripts, 
to the middle works in German Ideology, and to his later works in Grundrisse and the 
Capital: 
The development of Marx’s thought is complex. In the German Ideology Marx 
rejected many of the views he had held in the 1844 Manuscripts. In the 
Grundrisse and Capital he rejected many of the views he had held in the German 
Ideology and moved closer to some of those he had held in 1844 but not without 
modifying them in view of the insights gained in the German Ideology. Marx’s 
thought cannot be summed up simply as an essential unity; nor did it undergo a 
neat-rupture. 93 
 
Kain underscores that there are changes in Marx’s thinking, but its development lacks a 
neat rupture where Marx is described as completely turning from being an idealist into a 
materialist or vice versa. For Kain, the realism of Marx’s later works (i.e. Grundrisse and 
 






Capital) is not a radical break from his middle works, since th realism in his later works 
is in fact a rehash of his epistemology.  
Similarly, Althusser sees that Marx’s thinking has developed, but this change, 
unlike with Kain’s reading, is a radical break from Marx’s early writings. He notes that 
Marx in his early works was expressing a humanistic philosophy before he was led to a 
“scientific discovery” in his later writings. As Althusser explains, the later Marx was led 
to break with every “philosophical anthropology or humanism” of the early works to 
address the inadequacy of the latter and provide a concrete knowledge that could realize 
practical change. 
Althusser narrates that at the start of 1845, Marx had criticized the “theoretical 
pretensions of philosophical humanism” of his early work as a mere ideology. Marx 
realized that his early humanism could not provide a concrete depiction of social reality 
that can realize social change. As a result, the later Marx developed a form of “theoretical 
anti-humanism.” This anti-humanism is a by-product of new conceptual ground, which 
no longer uses man as a primary concept to explain the relevant phenomenon. It rather 
introduces new concepts such as, “social formation, productive forces, relations of 
productions, superstructure, ideologies, determination in the last instance by the 
economy, specific determination of the other levels, etc” to make sense of the social 
reality.94  
Kain and Althusser have different version of Marx’s development. While 
Althusser underscores the “radical rupture” in Marx, Kain, on the other hand, rejects this 
 





radical shift to show an intricate image of how the later Marx rejected his middle works 
(e.g. Theses and German Ideology) while reworking the ideas of his early writings.95 
Aside from that,  Althusser’s version refers to the development of Marx’s philosophy in 
general (which includes his epistemology), while Kain precisely explains the changes in 
Marx’s epistemology. But despite of the differences, each reading questions the 
assumption of a unified Marx, as each version proves that there is a development in the 
philosopher’s thinking. 
If the idea of a unified Marx is questionable, then the approach to read the 
Manuscripts should acknowledge this issue. The claims of the Manuscripts should not be 
prejudged on the basis of an assumed single epistemology, since the questionable 
assumption based on the debate on whether there’s continuity or break in Marx’s thinking 
must firsts be settled. Marx’s whole corpus should be examined, and reading limited to 
the Manuscripts does not provide ground to assert whether Marx has a unified view or 
none. 
 Although certainly, at this juncture, the work cannot confirm whether Marx has a 
unified epistemology or there are, as Kain and Althusser suggest it, significant changes in 
his views, this limitation does not warrant a reductive reading of the Manuscripts.  Even 
if it is correct to assume that Marx has a unified thinking, it does not follow that his texts 
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should be read out of its context and use its passages carelessly. In fact, the best way to 
confirm the unity of Marx’s thought is to read the Manuscripts properly, and show that 
although the texts belong to early Marx and have a different setting and concerns, his 
epistemological views and concepts still express continuity with his later works. For 
example, Marx often describes himself in the Manuscripts as a follower of naturalist 
philosophy. 96An erroneous approach in interpreting Marx’s naturalism is to understand it 
as an expression of his realism based on the assumption that Marx’s philosophy expresses 
realism as a whole. To correct this approach, Marx’s naturalist assertion should be read 
on its proper context as what the texts suggest. It should be interpreted in view of 
Feuerbach’s influence and Marx’s position against German idealism to get what Marx 
actually wants to express, since these are contexts where Marx set his naturalist 
assertion.97 
Nevertheless, to simply assume the unity of Marx’s thinking is a counter-
productive way to understand the epistemological claims in the Manuscripts. Such an 
assumption forces the passages from the Manuscripts to support the contentious 
presumption that there’s a unity in Marx’s thinking. Such a reading dismisses the richness 
of the Manuscripts, as it disregards the possibility that Marx’s epistemology could have 
developed and could have changed throughout his thinking, and that the early writings 
like the Manuscripts could have contained an epistemology different from Marx’s later 
writings. 
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The Context of the Manuscripts 
Instead of reading the passages of the Manuscripts basing on the later writings 
and single epistemology of Marx, they should be read on its own terms, themes, and 
context. This approach acknowledges the Althusserian spirit of reading the Early text of 
Marx on its own problematic. For him, the “analytic-teleological method” or the 
assumption of the unity of all elements in Marx’s text must be rejected.  Although this 
work does not follow the details and technicalities of Althusser’s view on ideology, 
which is what he termed as the application of “Marxist principles of a theory of 
ideological development to our object,” it rather maintains the spirit of Althusser’s 
inquiry that suggests that the early texts, such as the Manuscripts, should be read in view 
of their internal unity and problematic and should not be reduced to later or unified Marx. 
As Althusser warns, “[o]f course, we know that Young Marx did become Marx, but we 
should not want to live in his place, reject for him or discover for him. We shall not be 
waiting for him at the end of the course to throw round him as round a runner the mantle 
of repose for at last it is over, he has arrived.”98 
Hence, this work shall read the Manuscripts and its passages on knowledge under 
its major themes. They are interpreted in the background that the Manuscripts is Marx’s 
early attempt to search for a new thinking or a theoretical ground to realize change in 
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society. More importantly, the Manuscripts must be approached on the background of the 
influence of the prominent ideas of its time – Hegel, Feuerbach, and Political economy. 
The texts’ epistemology is anchored in Marx’s critique of the Hegelian philosophy, the 
influence of Feuerbach’s naturalism and humanism, and the critical analysis of the 
political economy.  
By recognizing the Manuscripts’ distinct context, this work avoids the 
problematic reductive reading of the texts. It is a more productive approach to the 
Manuscripts, since their passages and concepts are read on the standpoint of their own 
particular context. Unlike the reductive reading, this method gives what is due to the 
Manuscripts, as it neither reduces its passages nor extracts them casually from Marx’s 
writings to merely support his later thoughts or a single epistemological view. This 
reading opens for a more meaningful understanding of the Manuscripts, as it seeks to 
understand its actual epistemology that could be different from his later thoughts or from 









THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE MANUSCRIPTS 
 
This section, as the title suggests, focuses on the epistemology of the 
Manuscripts. It shows how Marx in this early work holds an idealist epistemology, as 
expressed through his method of critique of the political economy; his concepts such as, 
need, objectivity, man, and nature; and some of his explicit statements about knowledge 
and knowing. Marx in the Manuscripts provides a rich epistemological writings, given its 
themes and its epistemologically fecund concepts Marx discussed. 
But before discussing the epistemological view of the Manuscripts, some things 
should be first said about the text’s structure important to clarify its content. The 
Manuscripts’ format also provides guide on how this work approaches the text to 
highlight its epistemological view. To begin with, there are three Manuscripts discovered 
and each has its own pagination in Roman figures. The first Manuscript is composed of 
27 pages. Originally, it was written in three columns, headed by Wages of Labour, or 
Profit of Capital, and Rent of Land; these titles are apparently related to the topics of 
Smith’s Wealth of Nation. The first Manuscript is epistemologically relevant in so far that 
it shows the method of Marx’s critique in his analysis of political economy. It shows that 
Marx begins with the application of his epistemological standpoint in the text by 
underscoring the contradictions and inadequacies of the economic aspect of the society. 





which put the worker in an unjust condition. Marx’s discussion on the condition of the 
workers in the first Manuscript culminates at the beginning of the 22nd page, where Marx 
starts a six-paged continuous discussion about the worker’s condition, which Marx’s 
editors famously entitled as the Estranged Labour. On this part, Marx explains that the 
system of private property makes the worker not at home with his working condition; he 
shows how the workers ironically lose life in their work.  
Unlike the first Manuscript, the second Manuscript is rather short as it is 
discovered incomplete with largely missing pages. In its publication, the second 
Manuscript runs for only 8 pages, missing 39 pages. It starts with a sentence fragment 
about the concept of interest and capital and ends abruptly about the hostile and 
reciprocal relationship between labour and capital. In this part, Marx discusses the 
relationships that emerge in private property, for example, the antithetical relationship 
between landed property and capital and how capital won over the landed property. Marx 
commends the political economy for discovering labour as the source of wealth rather 
than land and private property. 
In comparison with the first and the second, the third Manuscript contains the 
richest epistemological discussions of Marx in the text. The editors discover that in 
contrast with the other two, the third Manuscript is the longest as it has 43 large pages. It 
also contains the introduction for the Manuscript, which its editors rearranged and put at 
the beginning. Among the epistemologically interesting parts, the third Manuscript 
contains the section entitled Critique of Hegel’s Dialectic and General Philosophy. In 
this section, Marx discusses his critique on the Hegelian cognition and his commendation 





the latter philosophers are important to understand how Marx formulates his view on 
knowledge. Aside from that, the third Manuscripts contain Marx’s discussion on 
Communism, Need, and Corporeal man. On his discussion of these concepts, he shows 
his idealist epistemology by depicting how corporeal man constitutes reality not only 
objectively but also subjectively, which means that man in some sense constructs what he 
or she knows. 
Since the most important epistemological claims of Marx is located in the third 
Manuscript, then there’s good reason to start not chronologically (i.e. from first to third) 
but from the concepts Marx explored in the third Manuscripts. This part is a good starting 
point, because compare to the other sections of the text, it contains the more explicit 
articulation of Marx’s epistemology.  
Hence, this section’s starting point is the third Manuscript, and its themes and 
concepts are explored and discussed in the first and second part. The first part, which is 
entitled as “Marx’s Critique of Hegel and Feuerbach,” discusses Marx’s critique of Hegel 
and Feuerbach’s influence to Marx. This part sets the context of Marx’s critique of the 
Hegelian philosophy, using the criticism of Feuerbach, to situate the idealist 
epistemology of the Manuscripts. 
The second part, entitled as “The Idealist Cognition of the Corporeal Man,” is a 
key piece as it articulates the idealism of Marx in the Manuscripts based on his concept 
of corporeal man, objectivity, and needs. This part begins with a discussion of how Marx 
follows the philosophical humanist tradition, which both Hegel and Feuerbach followed. 
Philosophical humanism typically provides a concept of man that serves as the ground for 





concept of corporeal man that is objective and has needs, which is contrary to the 
Hegelian view as Marx understands it. With this concept of corporeality, Marx provides 
ground for the constitution of reality both objectively and subjectively; he acknowledges 
how corporeal man and his or her condition shape the cognition of reality. This idea 
highlights the idealism of the Manuscripts, which is emphasized at the end of this 
chapter.  
After articulating Marx’s epistemological view in the Manuscripts, the third 
section of this chapter, entitled as “Marx’s Idealist and the Critique of Political 
Economy” shows how Marx applies his epistemological view in his critique of political 
economy by underscoring how Marx unravels the subjective ground of political 
economy. This section focuses on the first Manuscript and offers a brief sketch of Marx’s 
critique of political economy, which culminates on his concept of estranged labour. After 
providing a sketch on how Marx critiques political economy, this part shows how Marx 
argues that the errors of the science of political economy are grounded on estranged need 
dominant in the system of private property. This estranged need for Marx shapes the 
political economists’ view of the reality. 
The last two sections of this chapter further clarify the idealist epistemology in the 
Manuscripts by discussing its other issues. The fourth section, entitled as “The 
Dissolution of the thing-in-itself in Practical Standpoint,” shows the issues concerning the 
similarities of Marx’s epistemological view and the concept of thing-in-itself. In the end, 
this section argues that the concept of thing-in-itself cannot be ascribed to Marx as it does 
not fit in the overall context and concept of Marx’s discussion, especially in his concept 





last section, entitled as “The Errors of the Realist Reading of the Manuscripts, addresses 
the issues that involve in the realist reading of the Manuscripts. It defends the idealist 
reading of the Manuscripts against the realist reading of the texts, highlighting the false 
dichotomy that pervades the realist reading.  
 
Marx’s Critique of Hegel and Feuerbach 
The epistemological view of the Manuscripts has emerged out of Marx’s critical 
engagement with the prominent ideas during his time – Hegel and Feuerbach’s 
philosophy.99 Marx’s hero at this point was Feuerbach, and he utilized the latter’s right-
wing reading of Hegel to build his own critique of Hegel’s philosophy. In the 
Manuscripts, Marx describes Feuerbach as the one who destroyed the “foundation of the 
old dialectic and philosophy” and the “true conqueror of the old philosophy.” 100  Marx in 
the Manuscripts acknowledges that Feuerbach’s ideas are “the only writings since 
 
99 The discussion of Marx’s epistemology is set on Feuerbach and Hegel, because these 
are the two philosophers Marx constantly mentioned in the Manuscripts. Marx also provides a 
lengthy discussion of Hegel while praising Feuerbach’s naturalism and humanism. To refer to 
these philosophers does not mean that I’m asserting a unified Marx from Feuerbach, Hegel, and 
early Marx. The early writings such as the Dissertations, On the Jewish Question and others are 
not discussed, there’s no claim that they are in unity with the Manuscripts. Furthermore, no way 
that setting the context using Hegel and Feuerbach implies an idea of unified Marx. They are used 
because their ideas can be found in the texts and even Marx recognizes them as his predecessors. 
100Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” 381. This old philosophy refers to 
Hegelian thinking, and Marx agrees with Feuerbach that this “philosophy is nothing more than 
religion brought into thought and developed in thought, and that it is equally to be condemned as 
another form and mode of existence of the estrangement of man’s nature.” For Marx, “Feuerbach 
is the only person who has a serious and a critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic.” He has 
greatly contributed in showing the flaws of Hegelian thinking, different to his contemporary 
Young Hegelians who “has not once voiced so much as a suspicion of the need for a critical 





Hegel’s Phenomenology and Logic to contain a real theoretical revolution.”101 He 
positively aligns his thinking with Feuerbach while he critically positions against Hegel 
and those he refers as critical theologians who are Hegel’s followers.102 
Influenced by the right-wing reading of Feuerbach who thinks that Hegel 
conceives mind as the creator of reality, Marx also criticizes the perceived 
supernaturalism of the Hegelian philosophy. At the latter part of the third Manuscript, in 
the section entitled Critique of Hegel’s Dialectic and General Philosophy, Marx objects 
against the claims of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind for reducing everything into the 
movement of consciousness, which leads to the loss of objectivity of things. Marx’s 
criticism here is epistemologically rich, since unlike his previous work, which is more 
about social and political, the Manuscripts touch the issues on cognition and how human 
beings are related to its object. Marx’s early focus on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, which 
is mainly about the development of state, shifted here to the Phenomenology, which is 
Hegel’s work about the development of cognition. In the Phenomenology, Hegel 
describes the cognitive development of the mind from its most basic perception to its 
journey to the realization of absolute knowledge and freedom. 
Following Feuerbach’ reading of Hegel, Marx in the Manuscripts shows how 
Hegel reduces everything into mind. He underscores that for Hegel, the movement of the 
mind, which is the “dialectic of pure thought,”103 mystically reduces every concrete event 
 
101 Ibid., 281.  
102Ibid., 381.  





in reality into thought, where the concrete is transformed into a mere moment in the 
whole movement of the Absolute Idea or Spirit. He complains that in Hegel’s philosophy, 
the idea and mind alone become the reality and “the true essence of man,” the human 
beings and their concrete activities and properties, such as religion, state, wealth and 
other human engagements, are reduced into abstract consciousness and “spiritual 
entities.”104 
Marx in the Manuscripts criticizes how Hegel turns the concrete reality into an 
abstract idea, and turns these ideas as supernatural causes of the concrete reality. For 
Marx, Hegel reverses the proper relation between the subject and predicate. He turns 
“[r]eal man and real nature” into “mere predicates” instead of treating them as subject. 
He rather treats “God, absolute spirit, the self-knowing and self-manifesting idea” as the 
subject and real actors in a form of “a mystical subject-object or subjectivity encroaching 
upon the object.”105 As a result of the inversion of the subject and predicate, Hegelian 
philosophy reduces man (the subject) into the activity of ideas and consciousness (the 
predicate). Instead of identifying the real man as the actors, Hegel turns the movement of 
ideas as the supernatural actors of human events and problems. 
Against the Hegelian view that reduces reality and the subject into consciousness, 
Marx in the Manuscripts, rather, provides an alternative view of the reality and subject. 
He emphasizes that the things and the subject are objective and not only created by 
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mind.106 Marx has found this novel thinking from Feuerbach who for him started the 
“positive, humanistic and naturalistic criticism.”107 For Marx, this naturalist-humanism is 
different from Hegel insofar that it acknowledges that man, who is a knowing subject, is 
a natural and a corporeal being, and therefore objective and has needs. This view is 
different from what he thought as Hegelian view of reducing the real men into a mere 
aspect of the Absolute; unlike Hegel who reduces everything into Absolute, Marx returns 
to a natural and corporeal man as the starting point of understanding reality.  
Furthermore, given Feuerbach’s influence, Marx’s humanist-naturalist criticism 
should no way be identified to naturalism in a positivist sense,108 which is a popular view 
for Marxism. Given the popularity of positivism during the 20th century, the Marxists 
held that naturalism simply means that the best pursuit of knowing nature is to study it 
scientifically; thus, this naturalism presupposes a realist epistemology as it also implies 
that nature independently exists to be studied by science. Marx’s naturalist-humanism, 
 
106 Rockmore, Marx after Marxism, 49. There are criticisms with this critique of Marx on 
Hegel, one of which, is on the manner Marx oversimplifies Hegel’s philosophy. Rockmore has 
mentioned this critique and pointed out the need to actually critique Hegel, which both Feuerbach 
and Marx’s right wing theological reading of the philosopher has failed to do so. But despite of 
Marx’s possible error, what is significant at this point is Marx’s critique shows the development 
of his thinking as in a contrary position from Hegelian thinking, showing at the same time his 
epistemological framework.  
107 Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” 281. 
108 Recent interpretation of these ideas of Marx’s naturalism can be read from Wood. 
When Marx identifies himself with naturalism, then it implies that he is a realist, since realism, or 
the idea that knowledge independently exists outside of one’s mind, is one tenets of naturalism. 
Wood’s reasoning, however, fails to provide warrant on the logical connection between 
naturalism and realism. Naturalism has no clear and necessary relation with the idea that 
knowledge is based on the independently existing structures. Logically speaking, even the idealist 
epistemology is compatible with Marx’s naturalist outlook. The idea that the subject actively 
constitutes knowledge expresses a human and natural knowledge, which is also an expression of a 





however, is set in the context of Feuerbach’s thinking. It should be understood in the 
context of philosophical humanism, which characterizes Feuerbach’s inquiry. This 
humanism inquires on the concept of man as the basis for understanding how man is 
actually related to the reality. The clarification of the concept of man also includes how 
human cognition relates to the reality. In Feuerbach’s version, he shows how our 
concepts are formulated in view of the natural characteristics of man. How, for example, 
our concept of God is produced out of our human condition. Marx follows this naturalist 
inquiry of Feuerbach and shows his own version of naturalist understanding of man, 
which had a critical implication in Marx’s epistemology. 
In his knotty relation with the Hegel’s and Feuerbach’s thinking, Marx shows his 
idealist epistemological view. His critique of Hegel and appraisal of Feuerbach’s 
naturalist and humanist criticism provide ground for his idealist concept of human 
cognition.  As what will be presented later, Marx in the Manuscripts is an 
epistemological idealist, as his ideas, although critical against Hegel through Feuerbach, 
maintain the post-Kantian thesis, that the mind, in a sense, constructs what it knows. 
Through his critical engagement with Hegel and Feuerbach, Marx sets the ground for his 
articulation of his epistemological idealist inclinations.  
Marx’s conception of man, cognition, objectivity, and need are defined in view of 
Marx’s critical appreciation of the Hegelian philosophy. Marx differentiates himself from 
Hegel as he defined man as corporeal and not merely as an aspect of the Absolute. This 
concept of man has an important epistemological implication, as it sets different 
condition of knowing. Contrary to Hegel, Marx idealist epistemology grounds the 





corporeal man, for Marx, acknowledges the independent existence of things yet still holds 
the idea that knowledge is constituted by man, as it is dependent on subject’s needs. 
Thus, although Marx maintains the German idealist view that acknowledges that the 
subject constitutes knowledge, Marx differentiates himself from the tradition, as he does 
not follow the supernaturalism and abstraction of the subject, which for him pervades the 
German idealism. Marx, although maintains the idea that man constitutes knowledge, 
does not think that reality is created by the Absolute mind or Idea. This point shall be 
further clarified in the succeeding sections, which discuss the concept of the corporeal 
man and how this subject constitutes reality.  
 
The Idealist Cognition of Corporeal Man 
 
Marx’s Philosophical Humanism 
As Marx has positively commended Feuerbach’s naturalism and humanism, he 
then adopted Feuerbach’s philosophical humanism, and similarly expounded the concept 
of man as a way to understand the character of human knowing. This idea of humanism 
should be understood in a philosophical context and should be distinguished from 
humanitarianism (or the love of humanity) and also from the revival of ancient classical 
works during the Renaissance period. Philosophical humanism is set on the tradition of 
formulating a view of knowledge based on a concept of human being.109 The British 
empiricists, for example, with their variety of understanding the human being, provided 
different views on knowledge. Locke, Hume, and Berkeley provided different 
 





conceptions of the knowing subject; and although they agree that all knowledge are based 
on experience, their varying concepts of human being provides each of them a different 
understanding on how the experiences are formulated and conceived by the subject.  
 Post-Kantian German philosophy, which includes as its practitioners Fichte, 
Hegel, and Feuerbach, are also humanists in this philosophical sense, as they defined a 
view on knowledge grounded on a certain conception of human being. The tradition was 
started by Kant as he had rethought the universal condition of knowing and established it 
based not only via reflection of independent reality in an Aristotelian sense but through 
the active participation of the subject. Kant, in his technical subject, termed this active 
subject as the transcendental unity of apperception. Hegel, however, criticized Kant’s 
concept of knowledge as ahistorical, hence non-human, and established a historical 
subject of knowing. Hegel historicized the human subject and showed how the 
epistemological and philosophical problems were product of the unfolding of the 
historical subject.  Feuerbach’s reading, however, criticized this Hegel’s concept of 
subject as a mystical subject. Hegel’s historicizing of the subject was premised upon the 
reduction of the subject and reality to mere movement of ideas.  Instead of mere ideas, 
Feuerbach rather launched a philosophical anthropology, and defined man as a natural 
subject who has needs that ground human concepts and understanding of the reality.110 
 
110 Rockmore, Marx after Marxism, 68. Rockmore traces this philosophical anthropology 
of Feuerbach from Kant.  Rockmore explains Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, pointing 
that in this text, “Feuerbach deepens the turn in philosophy after Kant to philosophical 
anthropology, or the basing of philosophy on a theory of the human person. Feuerbach typically 
stresses that reason is human reason, and that all knowledge is human knowledge in arguing for 





The humanism in Feuerbach’s philosophy is best exemplified in his articulation of 
the ground of the concept of God. In the Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach revealed that 
the secret of God and religion is the human being. For him, human beings created God 
out of their need to answer their unanswered questions, alleviate their sufferings, and 
satisfy their eternally unsatisfied needs. As Feuerbach writes, “[t]he more empty life is, 
the fuller, the more concrete is God. The impoverishing of the real world and the 
enriching of God is one act. Only the poor man has a rich God.”111 God accordingly is 
nothing but a reflection of a natural needs of man, “God,” for Feuerbach,  “springs out of 
the feeling of a want, what man is in need of, whether this be definite and therefore 
conscious or unconscious need—that is God. Thus, the disconsolate feeling of a void, of 
loneliness, needed a God in whom there is society, a union being fervently loving each 
other.”112 Feuerbach suggested that human needs drove the creation of the reality of God. 
For him, God is a product of various drives: an intellectual need, or a need to alleviate a 
life of suffering, or a need to fill an empty life.  
 Even though Marx loosely defined naturalism and humanism and often used 
these terms interchangeably, the major theme of humanist thinking is clearly shown in the 
Manuscripts. Following Feuerbach’s philosophical anthropology, Marx in the 
Manuscripts defines the concept of man as a corporeal being, a being which is objective 
and has needs. The concept of a corporeal man is contrasted from abstracted man and 
mystical subject in the form of Absolute Idea, which what Marx referred as the Hegelian 
 
111 Ludwig Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, Trans. George Eliot (Walnut: MSAC 






uncritical Idealism. Marx’s conception of man has an important epistemological 
implication. Like the philosophical humanists, Marx’s concept of corporeal man grounds 
a distinct epistemological view. As what remains to be shown, Marx’s re-
conceptualization of man as corporeal still retains the basic idealist thesis that human 
beings in some sense produce knowledge and at the same time provide a different ground 
of knowledge. 
 
The Corporeal Man as an Objective Being  
Marx in the Manuscripts first defines man as a corporeal being who is part of 
nature, like trees, birds, and sky. Man, for him, is “real, corporeal man” who’s “feet 
firmly planted on the solid earth breathing all the powers of nature.”113 He underscores 
that man is an objective being, and by doing so, he disengages this concept from the idea 
of man as a mere participant in the movement of Hegel’s Absolute spirit. As Marx further 
continues, he points out that, 
When real, corporeal man, his feet firmly planted on the solid earth breathing all 
the powers of nature, establishes his real, objective essential powers as alien 
objects by externalization, it is not the establishing which is subject; it is the 
subjectivity of the objective essential powers whose action must therefore be an 
objective one. It creates and establishes only objects because it is established by 
objects, because it is fundamentally nature.114 
 
By underscoring that man’s objective activity is expressed through externalization, Marx 
contrasts his concept of man to what he conceived as the Hegelian reduction of 
 
113 Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” 389.  





everything into the movement of ideas, which includes man. Man for him is not a mere 
Hegelian abstraction.  
This concept of man is a product of, as what noted earlier, Feuerbach’s and 
Marx’s right-wing criticism of Hegel. In this reading, Hegel is thought to conceive the 
subject as being reduced to mere aspect of the unfolding of the self-realizing Idea.  
Contrary to Hegel’s transformation of the human subject into ideas, Marx in the 
Manuscripts clarifies that the subject and the actors are not mere ideas but real corporeal 
beings that are part of nature. To treat man as nature means that he/she is neither spirit 
nor idea, which is a being that lacks flesh and bodies. 
 As a corporeal being, Marx further underscores that man is an objective being, 
which means that man, as being part of nature, is not an isolated ego, since “there are 
objects [that exist] outside” of them.115 These objects can affect man, since man is part of 
them. As an objective being, man can be grasped by the other beings since man has a 
body outside oneself that can be grasped by the senses. As Marx writes, “[t]o be 
objective, natural and sensuous and to have object, nature and sense outside of oneself, or 
to be oneself object, nature, and sense for third person is one and the same thing.”116  
Marx further describes that an objective man is engaged in an objective activity, 
which means that man does not only subjectively constitutes reality by cognition but it is 
also constituted through real corporeal action. Man is thought to create reality actively in 
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reality through labour and not only through consciousness and intellect.117 Marx 
emphasizes that what transforms the reality is not the idea of “establishing” but it is the 
subjects’ objective action that establishes its objects. This concept of objectification, 
where man objectifies his essence in nature, carries the Hegelian notion of 
“externalization.” Marx’s Feuerbach’s right-wing reading of Hegel, however, prevents 
Marx of acknowledging this similarity with Hegel. Instead, he contrasts his concept of 
objective and natural human subject from the concept of man that is reduced into 
unfolding of ideas, which what he thought as the implication of Hegel’s philosophy. 
As man is an objective being, Marx also describes that corporeal man is a being 
that has needs. As man is a sensuous being who is a part of nature, it means that men are 
affected, suffering, and possessing drives, and therefore s/he needs objects outside of 
his/her. As Marx further defines the objective man, he claims that,  
Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he 
is on the one hand equipped with natural powers, with vital powers, he is an 
active natural being; these powers exist in him as dispositions and capacities, as 
drives. On the other hand, as  a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is 
a suffering, conditioned and limited being, like animals and plants. That is to say, 
the objects of his drives exist outside of him as objects independent of him; but 
these objects are objects of his need, essential objects, indispensable to the 
exercise and confirmation of his essential powers. To say that man is a corporeal, 
living, real, sensuous objective being with natural powers means that he has real, 
sensuous objects as the object of his being and of his vital expression, or that, he 
can only express his life in real, sensuous objects.118    
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Given that the corporeal man suffers and thus has need, this aspect of man carries through 
his activity and affects his constitution of realty. As man is driven by needs, Marx 
clarifies that the objects of man does not only exist independently from man but these 
objects are objects of human needs.  It means that in some sense the object that 
independently exists outside of man is affected by his needs. This need, as what will be 
elaborated later, affects not only the objective activity of man but also the subjective and 
cognitive aspect of him. 
 
The Corporeal Man’s Constitution of Reality 
 
 Grounded on his depiction of a corporeal man who is objective and has needs, 
Marx would also redefine the manner where man constitutes reality objectively and more 
importantly, subjectively. What Marx is doing is not new in a philosophical humanist 
tradition. Both Kantian and Post-Kantian tradition show that the various views on the 
cognition of the world are based on a certain concept of human being. Kant’s 
transcendental apperception, Hegel’s historical man, and Feuerbach’s natural man 
suggest different nuances in the way man cognizes reality. Similar with these 
philosophical humanists, Marx’s conception of a corporeal subject redefines how the 
objective reality is constituted and perceived by these subjects. 
Given that corporeal man is being driven by needs, Marx puts a special emphasis 
on this concept of need to show it shapes man’s objective and subjective constitution of 
reality. Marx’s concept of need generally refers to what human beings’ desire in order to 





subsistence, since for Marx man needs more than animals and plants, which are limited to 
their survival. Marx, however, does not provide a discussion on ontology of need119 in his 
text. What he rather provides in the Manuscripts is an ostensive conception of need, 
identifying the three types of it. First is the basic need of subsistence common to human 
beings. Second is the estranged need, which for Marx manifests in various forms in the 
capitalist society, but essentially boils to the need to profit and multiplication of capital. 
And third is the human need. Marx describes this need as liberated from the estranged 
need to profit. It is rather the need to realize what is essential to the human person, which 
is not limited to material wealth or money.120 
In the context of the Manuscripts’ discussion of objectivity, Marx describes man 
as driven by hunger, and this need, as he further suggests, requires a “nature” or an 
“object” for its realization. As he writes, 
Hunger is a natural need; it therefore requires a nature and an object outside itself 
in order to satisfy and still itself. Hunger is the acknowledged need of my body 
for an object which exists outside itself and which is indispensible to its 
integration and to the expression of its essential nature.121  
 
In this passage, he shows that there’s an important relation between need and its object. 
He suggests that the confirmation of need can only be realized through a subject outside 
 
119 A discussion on Marx’s concept of need can be read on Frédéric Lordon, Willing 
Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx on Desire (London: Verso Books, 2014). London uses 
Spinoza’s concept of conatus to illuminate Marx’s concept of need and desire.  
120Marx’s usage of the concept of need is scattered in the Manuscripts. But there are also 
parts where Marx is more explicit on his ideas of it. Marx, “Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts,” ff:  299-230, 354-356, 359-361. 





itself, yet at same time, he also acknowledges that the recognition of an object is also 
realized through needs.  
Marx underscores that need constitutes things, as he describes how need, in 
general, is related to its object. To establish this point, Marx first describes how object is 
constituted through its relation to the other objects. He clarifies that an object is 
constituted not out of its independent existence alone from man and from other objects. 
For him, an object is a product of relation among objects, which includes man and nature. 
Objectivity is more than the idea of independent existence outside of man, because it also 
requires that it must be an object of a third person. Marx stresses that a being is an object 
if it is an object of another. He even goes further in saying that “[a] being which is not 
itself an object for a third being has no being for its object, i.e. it has no objective 
relationships and its existence is not objective.”122 In other words, for him, an object, 
without being an object of another being, is equivalent to non-being. What Marx wants to 
point out here is that a thing (x) may exists outside of all beings in the world but if it does 
not participate in any kind of objective relation, whether a thing is grasped by senses, or 
an object of thought, of love, of desire, which what Marx thinks as form of objective 
relation, then its existence is of no concern to anyone. 
  Among these objective relations (e.g. object of senses, of love, of desire, et. al.), 
Marx places a critical role on the needs of beings as what establishes the relation of one 
object to another and eventually constitutes its objective existence. For him, need 







and at the same time it is needed. As for example, Marx cites how plant and sun establish 
a relation with each other. “The sun” Marx writes “is an object for the plant, an 
indispensible object which confirms its life, just as the plant is an object for the sun, an 
expression of its life-awakening power and its objective essential power.”123 He describes 
how the sun and plant mutually establish their objectivity. Although not explicitly 
mentioned in the passage, Marx places need an important key in constituting the 
objectivity of each other: the sun becomes an object for a plant in so far that it is needed 
by a plant to grow, and at the same time, a plant becomes an object for sun, not because it 
needs a plant to grow, but because it needs a plant to affirm its characteristics and power 
(e.g. light, life giving being), which then affirms the objective existence of the sun. What 
he shows in the relation between sun and plant is that need, which seeks for another being 
for its satisfaction, affirms the existence of another being.  
Like the relation between sun and plant, the same is true with the relation of 
corporeal men and how they constitute nature and at the same time be constituted by 
nature. Like how plant possesses needs, Marx also acknowledges that human being has 
needs (e.g. hunger) and this need is affirmed by constituting an object and nature outside 
of man. Unlike plant and sun, however, man is rather a more complex being. The 
relationship of man and his/her object is not only established by an object being an object 
of consumption for man, like how plant needs sun, and how the sun in some sense affirms 
its being by the consumption of plant. Men’s need and their constitution of objects are not 







intellectual, and conscious life of man. As Marx concludes his concept of man in the 
Manuscripts, he clears that, 
But man is not only a natural being; he is a human natural being; i.e. he is a being 
for himself and hence a specie being, as which he must confirm and realize 
himself both in his being and his knowing, Consequently, human objects are not 
natural objects as they immediately present themselves, nor is human sense in its 
immediate and objective existence, human sensibility and human objectivity. 
Neither objective nor subjective nature is immediately present in a form adequate 
to the human being. And as everything natural must come into being, so man also 
has his process of origin in history. But for him history is a conscious process, and 
hence one which consciously supersedes itself. History is the truth natural history 
of man.124 
 
In this passage, Marx confirms that the modification of man of nature does not only 
happen through objective activity alone but also through human cognition and self-
consciousness. Marx’s discussion on how objective reality is constituted by needs is not 
only limited to the constitution of reality through labour. He rather describes that 
consciousness are what made man different from the other objects from nature. The 
reality for Marx is not only an object of consumption but also an object of thought. Here, 
he clarifies that man is a holistic being, who is composed of both physical and mental 
activity. Thus, when Marx asserts that man constitutes nature, he thinks that the 
constitution happens holistically, as nature is being modified “objectively” through 
human activity and also “subjectively” through the human conscious process.   
With man’s holistic constitution of nature, Marx notes that human beings are 
incapable to grasp the “immediate” nature, since we have modified and transformed it to 
satisfy our needs. Beginning with the raw and untransformed nature, we have laboured on 
 





it: tilled the grasslands into agricultural space, cut the trees and built houses and societies, 
and still, build and invent more, as expressed in our modern industrial societies, all to 
address the needs of man.  
But aside from the objective activities of men, Marx also notes that men have also 
lost the grasp of the immediate nature out of our subjective activity. Here, Hegel still 
rings in the discussion of Marx, the concept of mediate and immediate are concepts 
Hegel used to describe the process through which consciousness grasps and becomes 
self-conscious of the truth. In rather abstract terms, for Hegel, the truth cannot be grasped 
by immediate acquaintance of an individual object. For him, grasping the truth undergoes 
a process where an object is mediated, that is, when an individual object is no longer 
grasped as an isolated object but as a product of contradictions, which are negated by 
comprehending an object in view of the greater whole, which what Hegel termed as the 
universal. It could be said that Marx no longer followed the same exact process of Hegel 
where truth become self-conscious for man. However, by suggesting that we are 
incapable to grasp an immediate nature subjectively, he clearly suggests a basic idealist 
thesis that nature must be brought in the level of thought and categories where it can be 
understood by man. In this process, it is clear that the Manuscripts refer to needs of man 
as what shapes the human thought of nature. In the Manuscripts, the human cognition is 
shaped not only by what exists outside of man but also on what is relevant to the 
subject’s needs. As what will be shown later, the need that emerges in the system or 
private property and the need for a more humane society play an important role in 





Marx in the Manuscripts sets that knowledge is shaped by corporeal man who is 
objective and has needs. Need for Marx is an important driver on how human being 
cognize the world; need is critical in constituting man’s objects that are to be consumed 
and to be conceived. At this point, we can see how Marx retains a basic idealist thesis, 
which Kant and post-Kantian tradition holds. Marx also holds the idea that knowledge is 
constituted by a subject, and for Marx it is the subject’s needs that play an important role 
in the constitution of the object of perception.  
Although Marx criticizes Hegel’s reduction of reality into consciousness, Marx 
remains as an idealist in view that he thinks that man subjectively grasps the reality in 
view of the subject’s needs. Marx does not subscribe to the idea that the independent 
existence of things alone is enough to be an object of man. Things may have independent 
existence but to be an object for man means that it must have an objective relation with 
man, which Marx underscores, as being established by needs. By acknowledging the role 
of the subject’s needs in the constitution of reality, he shows how the reality is dependent 
on the subject, where men are incapable to cognize nature immediately because of their 
needs, in so far that their needs determine objectivity, and hence affects their perception 
of the reality. As what discussed previously, the reality is constituted both objectively and 
subjectively through needs. On the subjective aspect, man’s cognition cannot grasp an 
immediate nature, since man—through needs—subjectively modifies his grasp of reality. 
How need plays an important role and precisely plays one’s cognition of the reality shall 
be further elaborated in the next chapter; it will show how the type of need that is 






Marx’s Idealism and the Critique of Political Economy 
Marx, as what the previous sections have shown, holds a basic idealist thesis, 
which asserts that subjects in some sense construct knowledge. What is distinctive, 
however, in Marx’s idealist view in the Manuscripts is on how he extends his idealism 
and applies it to the realm of the political economy. In the Manuscripts, Marx further 
shows how the subject’s needs affect the cognition of the reality. The type of need that 
drives the human subject shapes the human cognition. To further clarify how the 
subjective need shapes the human cognition, this section expounds on a particular need 
that is dominant in the private property; it shows and how this particular need, for Marx, 
supported the emergence of the science of the political economy. Marx refers to this need 
as an “estranged need,” which can be described roughly as a need to profit and 
accumulate more private property. For Marx, the estranged need is also the ground of 
political economy’s abstractions, contradictions, and its neglect of the estranged 
condition he observable in the economic system of private property.  
 
Marx’s Critique of Political Economy  
Marx, in his autobiographical remark, traced the start of his concern over political 
economy when he was working as an editor of Rheinische Zeitung, an independent and 
radical newspaper. His newspaper experience has directed his interest not on ideas and 
logic of consciousness but to the issues of material condition, such as the debates on 





Rhenish, and issues on free trade and protection.125 After his editorial stint, Marx’s 
interest on the economic concerns further grew when he read on Engel’s Outline of a 
Critique of Political Economy in Paris.126 His encounter of the text provided him an 
initial sketch of the character of the political economy. He even acknowledged Engels’ 
Outline as one of his major influences at the preface of the Manuscripts.127  
The Outline shows that political economy sprang at the expansion of trade and 
commerce, when the economy was experiencing radical changes. As Engels describes, 
the science of economy, which is founded on the famous works of Smith, Mill, and 
Ricardo, elaborates the laws of private property and its basic economic categories when 
the old order established by the feudal and guild systems have been overcome by the 
growing industries and rising merchant class. The Outline’s aim, moreover, is to expose 
the immorality of this new economic system and its defenders, the political economists.  
Engels underscores that political economy is but a form of a “licensed fraud,” as this 
science does not articulate the laws of private property but only provide a justification of 
an economic system that impoverishes and dehumanizes humanity.128 
Inspired by his reading of Engel’s Outline in Paris, Marx started reading 
numerous literatures of the political economists namely, Smith, Mill, Ricardo, Say, List, 
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Osiander, and Skarbek. Large excerpts from these authors were collected in his Paris 
writings, primarily in the Manuscripts of 1844,129 where he declared to have his early 
“critical study of the political economy.” 130 
Before launching into what Marx’s critique is, it is important to note that Marx in 
the Manuscripts praises political economy for discovering the secret of the wealth of 
private property in human labour. Marx recognizes Smith as the Martin Luther of the 
political economy, just as Luther grounded religion and salvation in the human being, 
Smith discovered the human labour as the ground of private property. For Marx, he 
explained that the wealth of private property is produced in the grounds of human labour, 
opposing the fetishistic idea that private property, such as money-capital and land, are the 
sources of wealth.  
In the Manuscripts, Marx certainly applauds political economists for discovering 
“labour” as the source of private property, but he has also plenty of criticisms against 
them. First, he criticizes their concept of labour as “abstracted,” as their notion of labour 
fails to capture the miserable lives of the workers, which is the real source of the wealth 
of nations.  Political economists ignore the estranged condition of the workers, which is 
the “real deduction of life.”131 They fail to see the ironic condition, “[where] labour 
produces marvels for the rich, but it produces privation for the worker. It produces 
palaces, but hovels for the worker. It produces beauty, but it casts some of the worker 
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back in the barbarous forms of labour and turns others into machines. It produces 
intelligence, but it produces idiocy and cretinism for the worker.”132 It makes the 
workers’ lives reduced to animal life, a “beast of burden… reduced to the minimum 
bodily needs.”133 
 Political economists, as the Manuscripts continue, only see work as a “wage-
earning activity.” They do not regard labour as a human work but a commodity, a living 
commodity that contributes more profit to capital. These economists, as the Manuscripts 
further add, 
regards labour abstractly as a thing; labour is a commodity; if price is high, the 
commodity is much in demand; if it is low, then it is much in supply; ‘the price of 
labour as a commodity must fall lower and lower.’134  
 
As a commodity, labour is governed by the laws of supply and demand, where the influx 
of labour’s supply makes the worker’s price and life declines. The value of workers’ lives 
is subjected to stiff competition of the capitalists against workers and workers against 
workers. These competitions pull labour to its cheapest price, which is the tendency of 
any product or commodity.135 Workers’ lives, as a result, are calculated on how much 
they could contribute to increase profit and how much they could produce more and 
could be paid less.  
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Second, aside from the abstracted concept of labour, Marx in the text further 
criticizes the political economy’s contradictory categories its proponents are not aware of. 
In the Manuscripts, he notes, for example, the conflicting claims of Smith who tells that 
“originally in theory the whole product of labour belongs to the labourer,” yet he also 
tells that the workers are supposed to get the “smallest part of the product,” only 
necessary to propagate the “slave class of the workers.”136 The idea that product belongs 
to workers is inconsistent with the other idea that the workers, as a wage-earner, only gets 
the minimum part enough for him to survive and for the capitalist to profit.  
In general, Marx shows that political economists commit to self-contradictions. 
He presents that these economists claim that labour is a means to buy everything, yet they 
also claim that labour also produces workers whose majority of life is work, and workers 
who are “far from position to buy everything” and must sell themselves and their 
humanity. Marx further notes that political economist also claim that labour is a “means” 
where man can enhance the “value of natural products,” it is the active property of man,” 
yet oddly, they claim that the landowners and the capitalists, who are “idle gods,” are 
much superior to the workers, as they are the one who establish the law for the 
workers.137 In whole, Marx describes the general problem of the political economists: 
their inconsistent economic categories that lead to self-contradictions. 
After showing the abstractions and contradictions of political economy, Marx 
completes his initial attack to this science by highlighting its inability to explain the 
 






emergence of the economic system of private property, which in the first place, it aims to 
describe. In the famous section of Estranged Labour, Marx complains that political 
economy merely describes the different categories of the private property in general but 
neglects to explain how its whole system was formed. He claims that political economy 
merely “proceeds from the fact of private property... it grasps [its] material process …, 
the process through which it actually passes, in general and abstract formulae which it 
then takes to be its laws.”138 But it does not “explain” the economic system, it “does not 
comprehend these laws, i.e. it does not show how they arise from the nature of private 
property,” it does not show its “necessary, inevitable and natural developments.” 139 Marx 
shows that political economy assumes that the system of private property, with its laws 
and categories, is a fact. It means that political economy fails to show that there are 
particular conditions that provide ground for its structures to flourish, that there are 
causes and reasons for the necessary development of the system that produces large 
estrangement in part of the workers. The problem, as Marx indicates, is that the political 
economy is unable to go deeper in its analysis, they ignore the “direct relationship 
between the worker (labour) and production.”140  
To address the shortcomings of the political economy, Marx attempts to explain 
the logical and necessary materialization of private property in reference to an “actual 
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economic fact” – the alienated labour.141 In the remainder of the first manuscript, he 
develops the concept of alienated labour to explain the system of private property. The 
Manuscripts on alienated labour depicts the real conditions of the worker: the worker 
who experiences inhumanity by being separated from his product, activity, specie-being, 
and from other human being. The concept, for Marx, explains the development of private 
property and the relations that appear in this system. As he expresses this discovery:  
It is true that we took the concept of alienated labour (alienated life) from political 
economy as a result of the movement of private property. But it is clear from an 
analysis of this concept that, although private property appears as the basis and 
cause of alienated labour it is in fact its consequence, just as the gods were 
originally not the cause but the effect of the confusion in men’s mind. Later, 
however, this relationship becomes`  reciprocal.142 
   
In this passage, Marx reverses the causal relation between private property and the 
alienated labour. Commonly, it is the economic system of private property that causes 
workers’ alienation. But for Marx, it is the other way around. The alienated labour is not 
only a product of the oppressive economic system but its root. The alienated labour 
created the system of private property and the relation that estranged the human being. As 
Marx continues, 
...through estranged labour man not only produces his relationship to the object 
and to the act of production as to alien and hostile powers; he also produces the 
relationship in which other men stand to his production and product, and the 
relationship in which he stands to these other men. Just as he creates his own 
product as a loss, a product which does not belong to him, so he creates the 
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domination of the non-producer over production and its product. Just as he 
estranges from himself his own activity, so he confers upon the stranger an 
activity which does not belong to him. 143 
 
Marx deduces the system of private property from estranged labour. For him, the 
estranged activity separates the worker from his product, activity, and species being, 
which what makes the worker not at home with what he is doing. Furthermore, the 
estranged labour produces the estranged and unjust capitalist-worker relationship, where 
the capitalists gain profit from the estranged activity of the workers, and where the 
workers are impoverished while the private property and its owner flourish.    
The political economy’s errors of assuming private property as fact and 
neglecting the glaring estrangement that is happening in this economic system is 
grounded on a certain needs dominant in a particular society. This point is taken in the 
next section. But before continuing this discussion, it is important to note that Marx’s 
critique of political economy highlights how this science puts man in a powerless 
position, where its laws and structures, in so far understood as an objective reality, are 
realities that can no longer be altered. On the contrary, Marx’s emphasis on estrangement 
in labour, and also in cognition, suggests that man himself is the one who created the 
estranged reality he has sunk in. With this assertion, he places man in an empowering 
position, where man has also the capacity to alter reality and view it in a different light. 
But the Manuscripts’ attempt to explain the development of private property 
through alienated labour is not without fault. The alienated labour as an explanatory 
concept is problematic, because it cannot explain the development of the economic 
 





categories developed in private property. Thus, Marx’s claim is problematic as he sees 
that the alienated labour alone could explain the development of categories in the 
political economy. Marx writes that, 
So with the help of these factors [estranged, alienated labour] it is possible to 
evolve all economic categories, and in each of these categories, e.g. trade, 
competition, capital, money, we shall identify only a particular and developed 
expression of these basic constituents.144 
 
But how exactly could estranged labour be the cause of all the categories in the political 
economy? Marx did not elaborate. Apparently, the concept is unable to provide 
explanations and essential connections why the private property operates in a certain 
manner. For example, the alienated labour cannot explain the development of private 
property from feudal land into industry. The concept of alienated labour is plagued with 
oversimplification, which makes it inadequate for its explanatory function. 
Furthermore, the Manuscripts’ claim that alienated labour is the root of private 
property begs the question of what is the root of this alienated labour?  Marx in his text, 
however, does not clear out the ground of alienated labour. At one point, he explains that 
alienation is ingrained in the characteristic of labour: “[t]he externalization of the worker 
in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, 
but that it exists outside him independently of him and alien to him...”145 And on the 
other parts, he refers to the same economic system of private property as the source of 
alienation, which arguably a form of circular reasoning. Marx returns to the idea that the 
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cause of estranged labour is none other than the private property. For him, “[w]ages 
[which is the aspect if private property] are an immediate consequence of estranged 
labour, and estranged labour is the immediate cause of private property.146 Marx 
expresses that estranged labour is the cause of private property, but the cause of estranged 
labour circles back to private property. It could be interpreted that the latter explanation 
shows how the alienated labour and private property supports each other in their 
coexistence. But on the other hand, Marx’s explanation could be understood as facing  a 
chicken and egg problem, where it is not clear whether the alienated labour or private 
property that comes first. What makes Marx’s reasoning inadequate is because his 
deduction proceeds from the very idea he needs to prove, which is labour as 
externalization – i.e. alienation – of the subject in nature, without proving first that it is 
really the actual cause.  
.  
The Subject’s Need and Political Economy 
The Manuscripts’ critique on political economy certainly has inadequacies, but 
despite of that, as what will be shown later, Marx’s critique exemplifies how he deepens 
his idealist view on knowledge and extends it as a way to show that the errors of political 
economy is grounded on a certain subjective aspect of man, which is their needs as 
dominant in the society. In this critique, Marx shows how the theoretical claims of 
political economy are shaped by a socially subjective need that is dominant in private 
property.  
 





Marx establishes relation between the condition of man and political economy at 
the opening part of the third Manuscript. He describes the political economy as a 
conscious reflection of the society in the system of private property. As Marx writes in 
the Manuscripts, 
It therefore goes without saying that only that political economy which 
recognized labour as its principle (Adam Smith) and which therefore no longer 
regarded private property as nothing more than a condition external to man, can 
be regarded as both a product of real energy and movement of private property (it 
is the independent movement of private property become conscious for itself, it is 
modern industry as self), a product of modern industry, and a factor which has 
accelerated and glorified the energy and development if this industry and 
transformed it into a power belonging to consciousness.147  
 
In this passage, Marx starts with the premise that political economy as a science is a 
product of an economic system. Political economy, for him, is a conscious or theoretical 
reflection of the material condition, which is the movement of private property and its 
latest development in the form of modern industry. The question is, how does political 
economy precisely become a theoretical reflection of private property? Marx next 
elucidates how this private property precisely shapes the claims of political economy. He 
then directs his attention to the subjective needs that emerge in private property and 
shows how it affects this economic science. 
 Marx in the Manuscripts elaborate the concept of need that is central in private 
property in different ways, but it boils down to its core idea that this need desires the 
benefit and profit of private property rather than realize what is essential to humanity. 
This need can be clarified in Marx’s discussion of the concept of specie being. Here, 
 





Marx describes how man’s labour, in the system of private property, has been reduced to 
satisfy “the need to maintain physical existence,” similar with how the beasts acts to 
satisfy their “immediate needs” to survive.148 The worker’s need is reduced into 
minimum, their maintenance. Marx differentiates that human’s productive life does not 
only aim to satisfy “immediate physical need” as man has the capacity to produce 
“according to the standard of every species” that is “in accordance with the laws of 
beauty.”149 In the context of addressing the estrangement in private property, Marx 
describes human need, as the acknowledgement of man and their social needs, “man’s 
need has become human need [when] the extent to which the other, as a human being, 
has become a need for him, the extent to which his most individual existence he is at the 
same time a communal being.”150  
The estranged need, however, is the dominant need in the system of private 
property. Marx at some point identified this need with the Capital, but it could be also 
interpreted that the need to profit is the need of the capitalist, the dominant class, “the 
alien being, to whom labour and the product of labour belong, in whose service labour is 
performed and for whose enjoyment the product of labor is created, can be none other 
than man himself.”151 Out of the capitalist’s need, everything is compromised for the sake 
of profit. For example, driven by this need, Marx describes how healthy environment is 
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sacrificed for the sake profit, as “[l]ight, air, etc. –the simplest animal cleanliness—ceases 
to be a need for man. Dirt – this pollution and putrefaction of man, the sewage of 
civilization—becomes an element of life for him.”152 The human life, in the same vein, is 
sacrificed, as this need encourages one to spend thrift and make everything “venal,” 
where one needs to save more and have more, because “the less you are, the less you give 
expression to your life, the more you have the greater your alienated life...”153 In this type 
of need, the genuine human relations are lost. Because of the drive to have more profit, 
this “need” creates more desires, that it “becomes the inventive and ever calculating slave 
of inhuman, refined, unnatural and imaginary appetites.”154 This need capitalizes that 
every need is a potential for profit, where “[e]ach person speculates on creating a new 
need in the other, with the aim of forcing him to make a new sacrifice, placing him in a 
new kind of enjoyment and hence economic ruin. Each attempts to establish over the 
other an alien power, in the hope of thereby achieving satisfaction of his own selfish 
needs.”155As this need prioritizes private property, Marx describes this need, with a 
moralistic sense, as an expression of anti-humanism, as its ideal act is to sacrifice 
everything – the environment, human beings, and human relations – for the sake of 
private property.  
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Marx sees that this need that has emerged in private property has an important 
role in shaping the inadequate claims of political economy. Political economy, 
which primly abstracts from this large area of human labour, and fails to sense its 
own inadequacy, even though such an extended wealth of human activity says 
nothing more to it perhaps than what can be said in one word—‘need,’ ‘common 
need’?156 
 
The inadequacies of political economy, for Marx, do not only refer to its contradictions 
but more importantly, it refers to its neglect of the real estranged condition of the workers 
as it only understands them in terms of abstract labour. For Marx, the distinctive need 
that has emerged in private property explains the inadequacies of political economy. The 
need to profit more explains why its thinkers only recognize the abstract labour but 
ignore the obvious estranged condition of the worker. The quantified abstract labour is 
the relevant concept for calculating how private property can accumulate more, and the 
concrete alienation of the workers, on the other hand, is ignored as it is irrelevant to 
benefit the private property. 
Marx explains the neglect of the abstract labour of political economy in the 
manner that emphasizes the effects of subject’s need to its claims. For him, as there’s a 
need to accumulate more private property, political economy “gives nothing to labour 
and everything to private property.”157 Political economy for Marx does not recognize the 
inhumane working condition of the labourers, because of it is focused on satisfying its 
need to profit and accumulate more. The workers’ concrete condition is disregarded as 
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they are abstractly understood on how much they can contribute for profitable end. Marx 
describes this abstraction of the workers in this process: 
…as political economy is concerned, the requirements of the worker can be 
narrowed down to one: the need to support him while he is working and prevent 
the race of workers from dying out. Wages therefore have exactly the same 
meaning as the maintenance and upkeep of any other productive instrument, or as 
the consumption of capital in general which is necessary if it is to reproduce itself 
with interest.158  
 
As Marx shows, the workers are reduced on the amount of wage enough for them survive 
and greatly contribute to the profit of capital. In this claim, Marx also shows that the 
reduction of the worker into abstract labour is precisely driven by the private property’s 
need to profit more. Because of this need, political economy only understands figures of 
workers, an abstracted quantity grasped on how much they can increase or decrease the 
capital.  
The subjective need that emerges in the setting of private property sets the 
parameters the where the political economy conceive the concept of labour. The need to 
profit means that labour should be understood on how much it serves this end, which the 
end concept is an abstract labour. This need, for Marx, explains why political economy 
cannot “recognize the unoccupied worker, the working man in so far as he is outside this 
work relationship. The swindler, the cheat, the beggar, the unemployed, the starving, the 
destitute and the criminal working man are figures which exist not for it.”159 This need 
also explains why political economy never questioned the glaring oppressive conditions 
 






arising in private property, and how they never wonder about the meaning of the 
reduction of “greater part of mankind to abstract labour.”160  
By explaining that socially subjective needs shape the thinking of political 
economy, Marx shows how he extends his idealist view of knowledge as grounded 
generally from the natural needs of man to a more specific type of need, which is 
dominant need in a society structured in private property. Marx still retains the idealist 
thesis where knowledge in some sense depends on the subject, but here, he shows that 
this set of knowledge is the science of political economy dependent on the subject’s 
needs under private property. Here the way Marx understands political economy clearly 
departs from a positivist and realist understanding of science, where science is only 
understood as a product of objectively discovering the elements and structure of an 
independent reality. With such an understanding of science, the errors of political 
economy are understood as a mere failure to provide an exactly theoretical copy of the 
independent reality. But for Marx, the errors of political economy are not precisely about 
its poor copy of the reality. More than that, the incapacity of the political economy to 
understand the social reality is rather based on the subjective ground where it is built, 
which is precisely on the type of need that drives this science. Contrary to the positivist 
sense of science, Marx views political economy as a science that has subjective grounds 
and not as a mere disinterested science. Political economy for him is formed by a certain 
subject that possesses particular needs that emerge in the system of private property. This 
description of political economy is more fitting for the idealist epistemological view, 
 





since it recognizes how the subjective aspects affect the cognition of the world; it also 
asserts that knowledge, in a certain sense, depends on the subject. 
 
The Dissolution the thing-in-itself in the Practical Standpoint 
One cannot completely discuss Marx’s idealist epistemology without addressing 
the question of whether he accepted the Kantian concept of the “thing-in-itself” in his 
epistemological view. The issue of thing-in-itself has become significant in the discussion 
of Marx’s epistemology as Engels has explicitly defined a concept of thing-in-itself in his 
realist interpretation of Marx. For Engels, Marx’s epistemological view should be 
distinguished from the agnosticism of Kantian philosophy.  He interprets Marx as a 
positivist who thinks that reality is ultimately matter independently existing from the 
subject and it can only be discovered through scientific investigation. As a result of his 
materialist and positivist framework, Engels posits that Marx’s concept of “thing-in-
itself,” if there’s any, is simply the reality not yet discovered by science. As Engels 
appropriates the concept of thing-in-itself, he explains: 
...The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained 
just such “thing-in-themselves” until organic chemistry began to produce them 
one after another, whereupon the “thing-in-itself” became a thing for us – as, for 
instance, alizarin, the coloring matter of the madder, which we no longer trouble 
to grow in the madder roots in the field, but produce much more cheaply and 
simply from coal tar.161   
 
Here, Engels departs from the initial introduction of the concept of thing-in-itself in 
Kant’s philosophy. He rather reconstructs the concept as an undiscovered matter. The 
 





concept of thing-in-itself is introduced by the Kantian idealist epistemology, which views 
that the subject’s knowledge is limited only to the phenomena, i.e. to the reality as what 
appears to the subject rather than to the actual reality. What the subject can perceive is 
only a thing for the subject and not a thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself (or the noumenal 
realm) is unknown to the human subject, since the categories of human cognition sets the 
conditions that limits the perception of the thing-in-itself, as this cognition provides form 
to the formless manifold of raw experiences. For Engels, however, the thing-in-itself is 
not a condition of human cognition but simply an unknown matter yet to be discovered 
by science. Eventually, for Engels, as soon as industry and science advance, this 
unknown matter (e.g. chemical and planets) will be known in time.  
But the Manuscripts, unlike of Engels’ interpretation, imply a limited condition of 
human knowing. In the Manuscripts, the unknown aspect of nature is not simply 
undiscovered by science but a condition of knowing. Although the text doesn’t explicitly 
use the term “thing-in-itself,” the idea that the available knowledge for man is dependent 
on human relation suggest that what is outside of the human needs is not an object for 
human concern, hence unknown to human being. In the Manuscripts, the knowledge of 
reality is dependent on man’s needs. Without human dependence, Marx even expresses 
that such reality is nothing. In an often quoted remark in the Manuscripts, he expresses 
how the concept of nature makes sense only on human being:   
nature too, taken abstractly for itself, and fixed in its separation from man, is 
nothing for man... Nature as nature, i.e. in so far as it is sensuously distinct from 





abstractions is nothing, a nothing proving itself to be nothing, it is devoid of sense 
or only has the sense of an externality to be superseded.162  
 
The Manuscripts’ discussion on nature is set in the context of Marx’s acknowledgement 
of the important contribution of the Hegelian philosophy. Before the remark on human 
dependency on nature, Marx praises Hegel for realizing that the concepts are human 
positing and creation. This thought, he sees, is the “positive achievement” of Hegel’s 
philosophy. He commends Hegel for realizing that the concepts and thoughts are results 
of “universal estrangement of human existence,”163 which means that the erroneous ideas 
of men are the result when men fail to realize the truth within themselves (i.e. men’s self 
estrangement), which in Hegel’s thought, men’s failure to realize that the concepts and 
ideas are product of men’s own consciousness. 
Marx’s approbation of some aspects of Hegel’s philosophy suggests that he 
agrees on the idea that the condition of the human existence determines the type of 
concepts significant and relevant in certain thinking. In the Manuscripts, Marx has been 
explicitly against the Hegelian view that reduces everything into abstraction of mind, yet 
the quoted passage show what Marx thinks as correct in Hegel’s philosophy.  In the 
passage, Marx sees nothing wrong on the idea that knowing nature involves abstracting 
and putting it into certain thoughts and categories. He acknowledges, like Hegel, that the 
concept of nature is in a certain sense dependent upon man. 
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Yet although Marx acknowledges the subjective dependence of the thinking about 
nature, he is cautious that his thinking could be identified plainly with what he thought as 
the Hegelian uncritical idealism. At the end of his praise on Hegel’s philosophy, Marx 
returns to his criticism on how Hegel crudely reduces everything into thought, that is, 
how Hegel erroneously reduces the external existence of things into an error of 
consciousness or its self-estrangement. Marx writes,  
Externality here is not to be understood as the self-externalizing world of sense 
open to the light, open to the man endowed with senses. It is to be taken here in 
the sense of alienation—a mistake, a defect, which ought not to be. For what is 
true is still the Idea. Nature is only the form o f the Idea's other being. And since 
abstract thought is the essence, that which is external to it is by its essence 
something merely external. The abstract thinker recognizes at the same time that 
sensuousness—externality in contrast to thought weaving within itself—is the 
essence of nature. But he expresses this contrast in such a way as to make this 
externality of nature, its contrast to thought, its defect, so that inasmuch as it is 
distinguished from abstraction, nature is something defective.  
A being which is defective not only for me, not only in my eyes, but in itself, has 
something outside itself which it lacks. 164 
 
By reducing objectivity as a form of illusion or a kind of defect, Marx critiques the 
abstraction in Hegel’s philosophy, which reduces the human beings with their history, 
society, institutions, and problems, are reduced into movement of self consciousness. 
Against this view, Marx delineates that externality and being object of sense of another 
are not human misconceptions. He clears out that the dependence of nature to man must 
not be understood as a simple reduction of nature into thought, where nature becomes 
merely a product of consciousness.  Marx, on the contrary, holds that nature still exists 
externally and independently from man.  
 





By maintaining the quality of “externality” in the Manuscripts, Marx denies that 
the subject produces the reality and its truth ex nihilo. He rather suggests that reality 
independently exists from man yet maintains the idealist view that knowledge is a 
product of man’s abstraction and categorization. Given that what we know from this 
independent reality is a product of man’s conceptions and abstractions, a concept of 
thing-in-itself is inevitable. If what is available knowledge of the external reality are the 
“objects for us,” then there are aspects of the external reality that is unknown, since it is 
not put into human categories as it is not an object of needs of man. In the Manuscripts, 
the “thing-in-itself” is a logical implication of Marx’s idealist conception that knowledge 
is constructed by human being and his condition.  
Probably, with the Manuscripts’ epistemology, it could imply that Marx suggests 
a certain concept of thing-in-itself. It could be interpreted that for Marx, human being has 
no capacity to know the nature in-themselves as Marx also explicitly states that nature is 
nothing without man, where the knowledge of nature is dependent to man. With this 
view, Marx’s critique of Hegel recurs back to some elements of Kantian epistemology. 
Myers, a Kantian Marxist, could be right in noting that like Kant, Marx views that 
“knowledge is the product of the interaction of the subject’s categorical structuring 
activity and the externally given raw material of sensation.”165 Like Kant, he holds “the 
belief that the object cannot be conceived without the subject that constructs it.”166  
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Similarly, Kolakowski, despite being cautious in distinguishing Marx from Kant, 
is ready to accept Kantian elements in Marx’s philosophy. Although Kolakowski does 
not use the term “for-itself” and “thing-in-itself,” he instead uses the term “humanized or 
anthropological nature” to suggest how the perception of nature is modified by man. He 
understands that nature, for Marx, is being humanized cognitively. As a consequence, he 
explains that for Marx, the subject cannot know the “in itself,” or the pure, absolute, and 
objective knowledge.  “[I]t is fundamentally futile,” he argues, “to hope that man by 
emancipating both elements of this relationship from himself can come to know the pure 
self, and thus himself as an independent consciousness, or else to know the pure 
“externality,” and thus existence in itself, which is not “given” to anyone.”167  
But the idea that Marx’s idealist epistemological view is the same with Kant, and 
that Marx also holds a concept of thing-in-itself, is rather questionable. One reason is that 
the development of Marx’s idealism is set in a different context with Kant. Unlike Kant 
who is set in the debate between empiricists and rationalists, Marx is set in the context of 
discussion and influence of being influenced primarily of Hegel and Feuerbach. The 
idealist view of Marx is produced out of his critical appraisal of Feuerbach’s naturalist-
humanism and his critical reading of Hegelian Idealism based on the right wing reading 
of the philosopher. Marx’s idealism is shaped as he acknowledges first the truth of the 
German idealist tradition (which is primarily Hegelian), which is the idea that the subject 
constructs the knowledge, and second, as he recognizes the naturalist criticism he adopted 
 





from Feuerbach, which underscores that the knowledge constructed be men is grounded 
not on a mystical subject but on a real corporeal man. 
Aside from that, the idea of thing-in-itself does not cohere with Marx’s concept of 
practice, as articulated in the Manuscripts.  In a certain sense, although Marx holds an 
idealist epistemology, Marx has able to evade the complications of the concept of thing-
in-itself, as he articulates a distinct standpoint where the corporeal man relates to reality. 
Marx calls this standpoint as the practical standpoint (practice).    
The practical standpoint evades the question of thing-in-itself as it limits the 
probable questions to be asked by restoring man’s unity with nature. In the Manuscripts, 
Marx poses the natural man in practice as a standpoint that sets what are possible 
questions to be inquired and what knowledge can be known. The practical standpoint is a 
man that is already engaged to his objects. A worker who is in production does not doubt 
the existence of the tools he is using or the objects of his productive activity. Presupposed 
in the practical activity is the existence of the things that can be an object of human 
engagements. In practice, Marx restores the unity between subject and object and man 
and nature, where “man as the existence of nature for man and nature as the existence of 
man for man.”168  
 As a standpoint, practice is contrasted from the contemplative attitude or the 
theoretical standpoint, which views the reality as an object of inquiry separated from 
human engagements.  The contemplative attitude has been articulated by several of 
Marx’s commentators to contrast with the practical standpoint. The contemplative 
 





attitude is understood as being detached and purely driven by a theoretical pursuit, which 
eventually leads to contradictions. It can be seen Descartes’ and Hume’s inquiries as 
primary examples of the contemplative standpoint; both also ended up into sceptical 
conclusions in their contemplation about the possibility of knowing an object. 
 The contemplative attitude, however, has questionable presumptions about the 
nature of relation between the knower and the known (i.e. the subject and object). The 
attitude separates the real things from our thoughts and creates a “destructive tension or 
unbridgeable gulf between our consciousness and real things we experience” leading to 
scepticism.169 It creates a gap that produces unnecessary questions and problems. 
Unlike the theoretical attitude that separates the subject from object, or man from 
nature, practice, for Marx, reunites man and nature and consciousness and its object. The 
standpoint opposes man’s separation from nature, which is a product of the abstraction of 
man from nature, which is a product of abstracting man out from its condition and place. 
The standpoint is against the fragmentation of human being, where consciousness is 
disunited from its object.  
With the practical standpoint, Marx criticizes the questions that apparently have 
no answers; he points out that there are questions that are impossible to pose when we are 
engaged in an activity, when we are into practice. Through the shift in standpoint, some 
questions are dissolved. Marx suggests that questions that search for “primary causes” of 
things, of “who begot the first man, and nature in general?”170, are product of a 
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fragmented subject from its object, which is “itself a product of abstraction.”171 These 
questions can only be asked if men are disengaged from their activities. These questions 
have become one of the primary concerns of philosophizing. They try to find out: “what 
is the origin of everything?” “Does god exist?” “Is god the primary cause?” “Is reality 
eternal.”172 Noting these types of questions, Marx highlights the foundation where these 
questions are grounded; these questions, for Marx, have a presupposed standpoint, which 
is not the practical but rather abstracted and fragmented, often referred as the 
contemplative attitude. Marx asks against those who inquire with those kind questions: 
Ask yourself how you arrived at that question. Ask yourself whether that question 
does not arise from a standpoint to which I cannot reply because it is a perverse 
one. Ask yourself whether that progression exists as such for rational thought.173  
 
With this remark, Marx launches what can be described as critical inquiry in a Kantian 
sense of the term, which is a search for the condition of knowing. Marx does not aim to 
answer those philosophical questions of cosmogony but posing another critical question, 
that is, how are these philosophical questions possible? Marx’s answer leads to the idea 
that these philosophical questions, which end into skepticism and paradoxes, are mere 
product of theoretical standpoint unnatural to man and which abstracts man from his/her 
activity.   
The same critical questions can be asked with the questions of “thing-in-itself.” 
How is the question of thing-in-itself possible? Given Marx’s critical analysis of the 
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grounds of the abstracted philosophical questions, it is reasonable to think that the inquiry 
about the thing-in-itself can only be posed from the standpoint of contemplation and can 
be dissolved in the practical standpoint, when the standpoint of man engaged in practice 
is adopted.  
 As the concept of thing-in-itself is posed in the contemplative standpoint, the 
concept could be seen as leading to self-contradiction, since the fact that it is unknown 
means that we cannot say anything or describe it as a certain kind of realm, yet we are 
describing it as something unknown, which means that in a certain sense, the realm is 
known.  
This kind of paradox arises when we assume that an object is unknown and a 
separated realm from man rather than a realm that is integrally connected to the human 
subject, since it is part of man in practice who integrally engaged with its object.  As 
Lukács correctly describes the said point, he explains that the question of thing-in-itself 
has lead to theoretical contradictions and therefore into scepticism. Thus, the culmination 
of modern philosophy in Kant ended into scepticism, which shows the limitation of the 
contemplative attitude. Kant’s concept of thing-in-itself, for Lukács, captures the limit of 
the theoretical attitude. The quest for understanding the reality objectively, that is, distant 
from subjective affects and condition concluded in the idea that the subject becomes 
limited to appearance and the object that man engages becomes unknown. Lukács notes 





analysis,” it leads into a pure theoretical picture, too formal, that it is liberated from all 
the content.174 
In the end, the thing-in-itself as part of Marx’s view on knowledge is incoherent 
with the overall view of Marx and to the ideas he has articulated in the Manuscripts. 
Engels’ reading of Marx’s thought is correct by noting that Marx in a certain way has 
resolved the issue of the question of thing-in-itself. But, to clarify, Marx does not resolve 
the issue by turning himself into a positivist or a realist. No way in the Manuscripts 
where Marx asserts that the thing-in-itself is simply a yet to be discovered unknown 
reality existing independently from the subject. If there’s any solution that Marx has 
given, it is the suggestion that the question of thing-in-itself is a product of a 
contemplative standpoint that destroys the unity between the subject and the object. The 
question can only be asked in the context of the subject being objectively distanced from 
its object. Thus, Marx’s solution to the question of thing-in-itself is not to discover it, 
because there’s actually nothing to be discovered. Marx would rather suggest to change 
our standpoint into practical to prevent posing meaningless questions produced in a 
standpoint that abstracts the subject and the object.  
Nonetheless, the development of Marx’s concept of practice does not lead him to 
entirely abandon an idealist epistemology. Although Marx develops practice as a 
standpoint that resolves the abstracted questions produced by the contemplative 
standpoint Marx criticized as perverse. Marx’s notion of practical standpoint is still 
grounded on an idealist epistemology, since, for Marx, practice as a standpoint implies 
 





that the subject has an active role in delineating the theoretical problems; this subjective 
standpoint modifies and even constructs what we can know and what can be asked. For 
Marx, the practical standpoint implies a consciousness that has a different starting point 
in viewing the reality. The practical standpoint, for Marx, is a “positive self-
consciousness of man,” a kind of consciousness where “its starting point is the 
theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as essential 
beings.”175 What Marx is suggesting here is that practice as a standpoint recognizes the 
world differently; the consciousness it carries is not only a theoretical consciousness, 
which is distant from its object but also a “practically sensuous consciousness” which 
acknowledges that man and nature are not mere ideas but also sensuous beings. The 
practical standpoint hence implies idealism as it recognizes subject’s active role in 
determining one’s view of the reality, hence, it determines knowledge. Marx’s 
articulation of practice as a standpoint suggests the relation between the subject and 
object arises not out of the subject’s mere passive and theoretical reproduction of the state 
of affairs but it is also grounded on the subject implied standpoint.  
If there’s any similarity between Marx and Kant, it is the recognition of the basic 
idealist thesis of a subject-dependent knowledge, which can be also grasped from the 
post-Kantian and philosophical humanist tradition. However, unlike Kant, Marx views 
that knowledge is produced not by subjects alone but by social subjects:  “the object of 
social knowledge cannot be understood apart from the social subjects that constructs 
 





it.”176 Marx advances that human beings, with their consciousness, views, and ideas 
belong not only in nature but also in a society. “The individual” Marx notes, “is the social 
being.” Thus, “[h]is vital expression – even when it does not appear in the direct form of 
a communal expression, conceived in association with other men – is therefore an 
expression and confirmation of social life”.177 Marx recognizes that men are social 
subjects, he differentiates himself from Kant, he views that knowledge is produced not by 
an individual alone but by a subject in a social condition. 
 
The Errors of the Realist Reading of the Manuscripts 
As the previous sections show how the Manuscripts express an idealist 
epistemology, this section addresses the issues involved in the realist reading of the 
Manuscripts. The sections show how corporeal man cognizes reality, discussing Marx’s 
concept of subjective constitution of objectivity, and showing how cognition of reality is 
shaped by man’s needs. It is also shows how Marx’s idealist view is deeply manifested in 
the Manuscripts, as Marx, using the idealist standpoint he established, critiques the 
science of political economy. In this critique, as what is shown in ealier, Marx discovers 
the subjective ground of political economy, noting how the estranged needs dominant in 
the system of private property shapes the claims of political economy and at the same 
time grounds its errors.  
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After showing the idealist epistemology of the Manuscripts, this section examines 
the realist reading of the texts and shows that this kind of reading is insufficient to reflect 
what Marx has written in the Manuscripts. The realist reading, which is best articulated in 
the recent works of Wood, erroneously simplifies the possible reading of Marx into two 
epistemological categories. For Wood, the reading of Marx’s epistemology is reduced 
either under uncritical idealism or realism, that is, whether Marx follows Hegelian 
uncritical idealism, which views that cognition creates reality or he follows a realist 
epistemology, which holds the idea of an independent reality from man. The limited 
dichotomy between uncritical idealism and realism neglects to articulate the other 
possible readings such as the epistemological idealism, which what is reflected in the 
Manuscripts. 
The argument of the realist reading of the Manuscripts is shown by Wood in his 
essay Materialist Realism. For him, Marx’s realism is premised on his critique of 
Hegelian idealism. As Wood explains, Marx’s opposition to the idea that the mind creates 
the reality suggests a shift of Marx’s thinking to realist epistemology. Wood argues this 
reading in the following form: 
It is true that Marx’s talk about nature as man’s ‘creation’ or ‘objectification’ is 
reminiscent of Hegel’s notion that nature is ‘posited’ by cosmic spirit as its 
‘externalization’. But the resemblance hardly justifies ascribing idealist views to 
Marx. Marx is emphatic that the process by which human beings ‘create’ nature 
or objectify themselves in it is labor, and he attacks Hegel for reducing this labor 
‘abstract mental labour.178  
 
 





Wood, in this passage, argues that Marx does not hold an idealist epistemology. Wood’s 
argument is premised on his understanding of uncritical idealism, which is a view where 
the mind can transform the reality. As Wood denies that Marx holds the idea that nature 
could be modified via cognition, he also denies that Marx holds an idealist epistemology. 
For him, Marx’s critique on Hegel’s abstract (mental) labour suggests that Marx also 
holds the idea that nature can only be transformed through objective labour. Given that 
for Marx only through objective labour alone where reality could be transformed, Wood 
thinks that Marx limits the role of cognition as a mere reflector of reality rather than a 
creator of it. Wood stresses that Marx holds a “reflective theory of knowledge,” where 
knowing merely means reflecting the independent reality and its properties, because the 
critique of Marx against the Hegelian form of idealism proves that he obviously 
subscribes to common-sense realism.179  
The main problem, however, of Wood’s reasoning, however, is it reduces the 
option of reading Marx into two: either as uncritical idealist or a realist, neglecting to 
articulate the epistemological idealist stance. As Wood underscores Marx’s critique of 
Hegel, he points out that the properties of things no way depend on man’s cognition, he 
then describes that, 
...the only way in which Marx thinks of nature or its properties as dependent on 
human beings is that the properties of natural objects can be changed by the direct 
or indirect action on them of human fingers (or bodily parts) guided by human 
intelligence. Both exist independently of the existence of human beings, and the 
properties they have do not depend on anyone’s being conscious (practically or 
otherwise) of these properties.180 
 
179 Ibid., 189-190. 






Wood’s assertion here is founded on a simplistic reasoning that if Marx criticizes the 
notion that reality is created by cognition, then reality must be independent from 
cognition, which for him implies that knowing the reality means copying its independent 
structure and properties. The point is if Marx criticizes certain form of idealism, it does 
not follow that he rejects all forms of idealism, such error occurred out of the conflations 
of idealism, which is discussed at the earlier chapter. One could acknowledge that 
Wood’s reading is correct, that Marx certainly criticizes Hegelian idealism, and reasserts 
the sense of objectivity lost in Hegel; however, Marx’s critique of Hegel does not follow 
that it implies realism and a copy theory of knowledge, since Marx’s critique of Hegel 
and his notion of objectivity are also logically compatible to an idealist epistemology. In 
fact, Marx’s assertion that we constitute reality both objectively and subjectively rather 
suggests an idealist thinking. 
Like other realists, Wood also conflated the uncritical idealism and the 
epistemological idealism, which results to his inadequate appreciation of the 
epistemological idealist reading of Marx.  Because Wood limits the epistemological 
implication of Marx’s critique of Hegel to either being a realist or an uncritical idealist, 
Wood’s reading overlooks the substantial evidence in the Manuscripts that clearly 
suggest an idealist epistemology. Wood, for instance, fails to completely articulate the 
unique concept of objectivity Marx expanded in the texts. He rather simplifies the way 





Manuscripts underscore the notion of “ontological objectivity of nature,”181 he, however, 
only defines it as suggesting the independent existence of things, which is just one of the 
aspects of objectivity as developed in the Manuscripts. His reading neglects Marx’s 
idealist assertion in the Manuscripts that object for human beings are object of his needs 
that exist independently of him, where knowledge of an independent object for Marx is 
constituted out of human needs. An object, for Marx, is not only an object because it 
exists but because it is an object of human needs. Thus, knowledge  
Furthermore, the realist claim that nature is only constituted through labour is also 
contradictory on the Manuscripts’ view that human beings constitute the view of nature 
subjectively. Marx in the Manuscripts views that the constitution of nature happens not 
only through labour but it happens holistically: nature is constituted both through 
objective labour and subjective consciousness. In the Manuscripts, Marx describes that 
the human beings constitute the object both objectively and subjectively to satisfy their 
needs. He views that knowledge is, in some sense, shaped subjectively through human 
needs, which is better understood under idealist epistemology. In the Manuscripts, Marx 
shows how need constitutes our subjective views, and this is further shown by Marx on 
how the subjective need that emerges in the private property shapes the claims of the 
political economy.  
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The epistemology of Marx developed in the Manuscripts is clearly different from 
his popular realist and positivist interpretation established by Marxism and Engels. The 
Manuscripts does not simply view that knowledge is produced by theoretically copying 
the independent reality or by a scientific investigation. Instead of reading Marx as 
holding the view that knowledge is based from an independent reality, he should be 
understood in the Manuscripts as expressing the idealism that asserts that knowledge is in 
some sense constructed by man. The realists’ and positivists’ neglect of Marx’s idealism 
in the Manuscripts overlooks much of what Marx wants to say in the text. These readings 
cannot make sense of how he articulates the ideas of need, objectivity, and his critique of 
Hegel and political economy.  
The idealist epistemology of the Manuscripts needs to be underscored, as the 
ideas of these texts stand at the critical juncture in the debate of Marx’s epistemology. 
The Manuscripts’ epistemology contributes in clarifying Marx’s early views on 
knowledge, which is a prerequisite to understand the overall development of the 
philosopher’s epistemology. To neglect the epistemology of these texts misses an 





epistemology. Early Marxists, for instance, unsatisfactorily conclude Marx as a realist, 
since the Manuscripts were absent in their initial formulation of Marx’s epistemology. 
Engels, who is a major influence to the early readings of Marx, mainly referred to Marx’s 
later works, which are the available texts during his time. The Marxists, influenced by 
Engels, similarly referred to these later works. 
The discovery and publication of the Manuscripts have resulted to richer 
discussions of Marx’s epistemology. The texts contain Marx’s important epistemological 
claims about man, need, and object, set in the critique of Hegel and political economy 
and critical adoption of Feuerbach’s naturalism and humanism. To clear that Marx’s 
epistemology in the text is idealism settles the discussion on how the Manuscripts should 
be read in view of its own epistemological assertions and in view of the development of 
Marx’s overall epistemology. 
As established previously, the idealism of the Manuscripts is rest in the tradition 
of Kant and Post-Kantian philosophies. Marx precisely set his discussion on his critical 
engagement of the philosophies of Hegel and Feuerbach. He utilizes Feuerbach’s reading 
of Hegel to position his own version of naturalism and humanism. This concept of 
humanism has a long tradition of defining man to clarify the way which man acquires 
knowledge. Like Feuerbach, Marx follows this tradition and defines man as a corporeal 
being, i.e. objective and being driven by needs. By defining man on this manner, Marx 
re-conceptualizes the idea of knowledge, showing how human knowledge is constructed 
out of the human corporeality, which is the human condition. He underscores that 
objectivity is dependent on the subject’s needs. Objective beings are not simply 





objective relations, most especially as an object of needs of another being, which in this 
case, man. Marx repeatedly underscores that an object is an object of man not only 
because it independently exists but because it is an object of human needs.  
But more than Feuerbach’s notion of man, Marx extends Feuerbach’s humanism 
to the realm of economy and its science and not only in the realm of religion. Framed 
under idealist epistemology, Marx critiques the political economy to show its errors and 
how it is driven by the subject’s needs dominant in the private property. Marx’s critique 
of political economy in the Manuscripts further proves how Marx views that knowledge 
(e.g. ideas, theories et. al.) is dependent on the socially subjective needs that drive the 
system of private property. For Marx, the need that emerges in system of private property 
explains not only the errors and contradictions of the political economy but also explains 
why this science neglects the glaring estrangements in the economic system. Marx’s 
critique shows that the dominant need to accumulate more is a factor that shapes the view 
of the political economy. It explains why this science only abstractly understands the 
workers as engaged in a wage-earning activity thereby neglecting their estranged 
condition.  
Given the Idealism of the Manuscripts, the realist reading of the texts fails to 
correctly grasp Marx’s concept of objectivity and needs as developed in the text. The 
realists neglect the Manuscripts’ key assertion that objectivity is in a sense determined by 
human needs, which suggests that knowledge is shaped by this aspect of human being. 
This misreading of the realists is grounded on their view of Marx’s notion of objectivity, 
which is limited to the idea of independent existence of things. As a result, the realists 





correctly understand Marx’s critique of political economy, where Marx unveils the 
subjective ground of this science in the subjective needs dominant in the system of 
private property. 
Aside from the textual evidence, what makes the idealist reading of the 
Manuscripts reasonable is because it is grounded on the proper approach of the text. First, 
this idealist reading is based on a careful delineation of the concepts of idealism. It avoids 
the erroneous conflation of different idealisms, which have been used in the discussion of 
Marx’s epistemology. This reading does not follow Engels’ conceptual definition, which 
understands idealism simply as either an ontological or an uncritical view. Engels’ 
conceptual distinctions are disregarded, because they cannot provide sense to the idealism 
in an epistemological sense. Engels only defines idealism as an assertion that reality is 
idea or that idea produces reality, neglecting its sense as an assertion that knowledge is 
produced, constructed, modified by the subject.  
 Second, this reading is conscientious of the distinct context of the Manuscripts. It 
does not follow, for example, Wood’s reading where he understands the claims in the 
Manuscripts in view of Marx’s later works such as the Grundrisse and the Capital. His 
reading fails to note the context of the Manuscripts: it disregards how Marx’s first 
encounter of the political economy and how his continuing critique of Hegelian 
philosophy brought him to an idealist epistemology, which maintains the independent 
existence of things and the subject’s cognition through needs. Contrary to Wood, this 
work’s approach is different from the reductive reading that has been employed to 
understand Marx. Against this reductive reading, the idealist reading of the Manuscripts 





The idealist reading is based on the recognition that any approach to the Manuscripts 
should recognize that it has its own epistemology and it cannot be reduced to the later 
works of Marx. To reduce the Manuscripts’ distinct view to Marx’s later works does not 
help in providing an overall idea of the development Marx’s epistemological view, that 
is, it could not confirm or deny whether Marx’s development in his later thoughts is 
continuous or has deviated from the framework he developed from his early works such 
as the Manuscripts. 
Taken together, the Manuscripts’ idealist view provides a significant insight on 
the aspect of how cognition could be also a force to address and change the estranged 
social conditions. Societal change, for Marx, does not happen through practical action, 
political movement, and revolution alone but also through development in consciousness 
and cognition.  
Certainly, Marx emphasizes that practical action can generate change, as he reacts 
against the prominent Hegelian notion that societal transformation can be realized 
through the movement and self-realization of consciousness. During Marx’s time, Hegel 
and Young Hegelians popularized the idea that the transformation of the realm of 
cognition and theory is a tool to practically change reality. For them, change in 
consciousness also means change in the empirical reality. Cognition of what is true, or 
being conscious to what is rational, is tantamount to transform the material reality.182 Set 
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in criticizing the Hegelian view of change, Marx underscores not the mere movement in 
self-understanding as the one that can provide change but practical action. Change is 
materialized by the objective and empirical actions—of real hands and feet—that hold 
and transform the reality. 
But aside from real action, Marx also acknowledges the important role of 
cognition for changing the society. Change in consciousness and thinking are also 
important aspects for resolving the contradictions of the estranged economic system. This 
view is grounded on Marx’s concept of a holistic human being that is both a subject and 
an object. Under the concept of a holistic man, the development of man’s subjective 
senses also changes the object of these senses, it also takes part in the transformation of 
the society. 
Marx shows this importance of the cognitive aspect in his discussion of the 
development of the communist movement. In the section Private Property and 
Communism, he expounds that the development of communism is a holistic process that 
involves not only the empirical action but also the birth of its thinking consciousness. As 
he writes,  
The entire movement of history is therefore both the actual act of creation of 
communism – the birth of its empirical existence – and, for its thinking 
consciousness, the comprehended and known movement of its becoming; whereas 
the other communism, which is not yet fully developed, seeks in isolated 
historical forms opposed to private property a historical proof for itself, a proof 
drawn from what already exists.183 
 
other hand, is knowledge that aims for the “ultimate, universal truth.” Unlike practice, this 
knowledge aims for knowledge for the sake of knowledge itself.     






For Marx, communism, which is a real movement that can positively supersede the 
estrangements in private property, needs to give birth to its “thinking consciousness” to 
be a fully realized movement. He further discusses this idea of development of thinking 
and subjective senses as he leads his discussion to private property. After his two sections 
devoted to Communism, Marx argues the need to develop the senses to address the 
estrangements of the private property. For him, the extent on how these subject’s senses 
developed determines the extent of one’s view of the reality. As Marx writes,  
... the most beautiful music has no sense for the unmusical ear, because my object 
can only be the confirmation of one of my essential power, i.e. can only be for me 
in so far as my essential power exists for me as a subjective attribute (this is 
because the sense of an object for me extends only as far as my sense extends, 
only has sense for a sense that corresponds to that object). In the same way, and 
for the same reasons, the senses of social man are different from those of non-
social man. Only through the objectively unfolded wealth of human nature can the 
wealth of subjective human sensitivity – a musical ear, an eye for the beauty of 
form, in short, senses capable of human gratification – be either cultivated or 
created. For not only the five senses, but also the so-called spiritual senses, the 
practical senses (will, love, etc.) in a word, the human sense the humanity of the 
senses – all these come into being only through the existence of their objects, 
through humanized nature.184  
 
Marx’s remark here is an important claim because it shows that the development of 
human senses, which includes thinking, is essential for determining the extent of what 
can be perceived as real. For him, political economy holds the undeveloped senses that 
limit its view of the social reality. It is driven by needs dominant in private property, a 
crude need centred on accumulating more private property. This crude sense of political 
 





economy explains why it cannot recognize the various estrangements of the workers in a 
capitalist world.  
Noting how Marx unveils the root of thinking, the Manuscripts’ critiques of 
political economy and  Hegelian idealism can be understood as not mere criticisms per 
se. Implied in these critical readings is the idea that cognition is an important factor for 
social change. For Marx, right theory and outlook should be developed; theoretical 
criticism must be also a paramount concern, because it is an important force to address 
the estranged condition set by private property. Marx calls to develop a form of cognition 
that is human as oppose to the crude senses of political economy. This cognition takes the 
man’s essential needs at the centre instead of the “egoistic desires” that are dominant in 
the system of private property. The human need is not a need of private property, it is not 
a selfish need for more accumulation. The human need instead is the need to emancipate 
man from the estrangement of private property. 185   
The human need, hence, produces a different understanding of the reality. 
Contrary to the estranged thinking, the human thinking, for Marx, views nature as an 
object that serves humanity and not only as an object of utility for egoistic ends.186 It 
conceives object in view on how it can satisfy the essential needs of human beings. 
Driven by human needs, Marx’s analysis discovers the estranged labour and the 
miserable lives of the workers from the abstractions of political economy. The human 
thinking, which is grounded on human needs, views the world differently compare to 
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thinking grounded on the estranged needs that has emerged in private property, which 
only understands labour as a mere process of production and not a process of 
dehumanization.187 In this human thinking, Marx notes that “[t]he eye has become human 
eye.” 188 It means that the object has “become a social, human object, made by man for 
man.”189 The transformation of an object to a human object suggests that these objects are 
no longer created for selfish needs to accumulate more profit. It is now created to serve 
the needs of the community. The cognition of the object is perceived not on how it serves 
the amassing of property but on how it realizes the essential human needs. Hence, for 
Marx, the “new need” of the workers and members of political movement for the “new 
society” is necessary for the birth of the communist consciousness and thinking.190 It 
shapes a new form of cognition. the emergence of a new thinking is not only based on the 
discovery of the outside world, because new thinking involves the cultivation of the new 
needs of man, a need that is more human in comparison with the need that emerges in 
private property. 
The Manuscripts’ idealism shows the revolutionary role of cognition in changing 
the society. It opens an epistemological task of developing knowledge not only by 
refining its tools to provide an exact representation of the reality but by re-grounding its 
foundation on human needs. As for Marx, “[t]he idea of one basis for life and another for 
 
187 Marx points the concept of abstract labour if seen sufficient, even “conceals the 
estrangement in the nature of labour.” Ibid., 325.  
188 Ibid.  
189 Ibid.  





science is from the very outset a lie”191 thus the ground of theoretical quest must not be 
the estranged needs but the human needs. This aspect of Marx’s thinking is important to 
highlight because of the widespread association of Marx to the cruelty and bloodshed that 
are associated to his name.192 Given the enormous violence that have transpired in the 
Soviet Russia that bears Marx’s name, he has been negatively interpreted as the 
foundation of these gruesome events. Man on these events seems powerless in face of the 
dictatorship of the state. But contrary to this view, the idealist view of the Manuscripts 
places man in a more powerful position, as man’s cognition no longer functions as a mere 
copy of what is out there. To underscore man and his capacity to question the 
assumptions of his thinking that produces estrangement, Marx returns man into an 
empowering point to address the different of estrangements that has emerged in the 
modern world. 
In the Manuscripts, cognition, rather, takes part in the drive to realize a humane 
world; it has the capacity to create a conception of reality that best serves the needs of 
humanity. Its idealism suggests that it has a critical role to play for changing and 
humanizing the world. It shows that the quest for societal change not only requires us to 
act but also to challenge our assumptions and foundations of our thinking. It requires us 
to be conscious, not only about the information we have in this world, but also with the 
interests and needs our cognition serves. In the end, the Manuscripts’ idealist 
epistemology provides a vantage point where the change even in our very cognition could 
be asked. It provides a space where we can challenge the foundation of cognition that 
 
191 Ibid., 355. 





supports and recreates estranged reality and to create a type of cognition that liberates 
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